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FROM GAUDIN TO GILES: CONTEXT, EQUITY, AND THE 
ADMISSION OF “WORDS FROM THE GRAVE” AGAINST 
THE ACCUSED KILLER 
Liza I. Karsai* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“If anything happens to me, Bobbie did it.”  Such explosively 
powerful evidence can be admitted at Bobbie’s homicide trial to prove 
that Bobbie did in fact do it, on the ground that Bobbie’s conduct 
constituted a forfeiture of her objections to the admission of the 
evidence.  Traditionally used to level the playing field when a defendant 
thwarted the prosecution by causing a witness to become unavailable for 
live testimony, the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine is increasingly 
used in homicide cases as a means of admitting the victim’s otherwise 
inadmissible hearsay statements against the victim’s accused killer.1  
Coined “reflexive application” of forfeiture by wrongdoing because both 
judge and jury must decide the same factual “predicate,” its basic tenet 
is that admission of the victim’s words against the accused killer is 
warranted where the victim has been silenced by the very act of 
homicide for which the defendant has been hailed before the court.2 
Scholars who advocate reflexive application of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing have called the defendant’s assertion of his Sixth 
Amendment right to confront witnesses, and of his objections to hearsay, 
“chutzpa”3  The potential for reflexive application of forfeiture by 
 * Associate Professor, Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School.  The author would like to thank 
Dean Richard Lynn, Professor Lee Adams, and Professor Helen de Haven for their support and for their 
comments on drafts of this Article.  She would also like to thank Professor Jeffrey van Detta and 
Professor Michael Kent for their encouragement and insight as well as Nicole Page for her invaluable 
research assistance. 
 1. See, e.g., State v. Calhoun, No. 91328, 2009 WL 1419498, slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 
21, 2009) (applying forfeiture by wrongdoing where defendant was charged with aggravated homicide 
for killing victim who was expected to testify against defendant at attempted homicide trial). 
 2. Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa, 31 ISR. L. REV. 506, 506, 
508, 522 (1997) [hereinafter Friedman, Chutzpa]; Josephine Ross, When Murder Alone Is Not Enough; 
Forfeiture of the Confrontation Clause After Giles, 24 CRIM. J. 24, 35–36 (2009).  Professor Friedman 
analogizes the homicide defendant’s assertion of his Confrontation Clause right and hearsay objections 
to “the man who kills both his parents and then begs the sentencing court to have mercy on an orphan.”  
Friedman, Chutzpa, supra, at 517.  But who should decide whether the man is guilty of killing his 
parents? 
 3. Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 2, at 506; Ross, supra note 2, at 35–36. 
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wrongdoing to greatly increase the likelihood of conviction has been the 
subject of significant lay press coverage in connection with highly 
publicized homicide prosecutions, such as the Drew Peterson case and 
the Mark Jensen murder-by-antifreeze trial.4  Legal commentators have 
lauded the doctrine’s potential for aiding convictions of perpetrators of 
domestic violence.5 
But, who is to decide whether the defendant killed the victim—judge, 
or jury?  When applied reflexively, a rule that “[d]efendants with 
unclean hands should not be able to invoke the constitutional 
confrontation doctrine and the hearsay rules in their defense”6 strips 
constitutional protections from those defendants deemed likely to be 
guilty, thereby increasing the likelihood of a guilty verdict, while other 
defendants, believed to be less likely culpable, retain their rights and 
enjoy greater likelihood of acquittal.7 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Giles v. California, that the 
Confrontation Clause demands that a purpose of the killing be to prevent 
the victim from becoming a testifying witness, does not adequately 
 4. Anderson Cooper 360: President Obama’s Supreme Court Pick?; Small Town, Big Change – 
Part 2 (CNN television broadcast May 22, 2009), transcript available at http://archives.cnn.com/ 
TRANSCRIPTS/0905/22/acd.01.html (discussing case against Drew Petersen and question of 
admissibility of victim’s statements to friends and families under forfeiture by wrongdoing rule); Larry 
King Live: Drew Peterson Arrested in Connection With Death of Third Wife; Interview With Kate of 
‘Jon & Kate Plus 8’; Maria Shriver’s Heartbreaking Battle (CNN television broadcast May 7, 2009), 
transcript available at http://archives.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0905/07/ lkl.01.html; Julie Manganis, 
DA: Suspect Took Photos of Girlfriend’s Murder, EAGLE-TRIBUNE, June 10, 2008, available at 
http://www.eagletribune.com/local/x1876436637/DA-Suspect-took-photos-of-girlfriends-murder/print 
(reporting prosecutor’s intent to introduce victim’s prior statements under forfeiture by wrongdoing 
rule); Barbara Grzincic, MD Woman Who Killed Husband Wins New Sentence, THE DAILY RECORD, 
May 2, 2005, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4183/ is_20050502/ai_n14609666/ 
(discussing insurance fraud case in which defendant, paradoxically—and unsuccessfully—argued that 
her deceased husband’s statements that she would kill him were admissible under forfeiture by 
wrongdoing only in the murder trial, but not in the insurance fraud trial). 
 5. Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing Their 
Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 889–90 (2009) [hereinafter Lininger, The Sound of Silence]; Tom 
Donaldson, Combating Victim/Witness Intimidation in Family Violence Cases: A Response to Critics of 
the “Forfeiture by Wrongdoing” Confrontation Exception Resurrected by the Supreme Court in 
Crawford and Davis, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 643, 699–700 (2008) (arguing that “fully functional wrongdoing 
exception is essential to combat victim/witness intimidation” such that a person who seeks assistance in 
ending domestic violence should be considered witnesses for purpose of doctrine). 
 6. Lininger, The Sound of Silence, supra note 5, at 911. 
 7. Compare People v. Banos, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 476, 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that it 
was not an error for the trial court to find that defendant’s knowledge that he would be prosecuted for 
prior domestic abuse and that victim would testify at those proceedings, such that purpose of killing was 
to prevent victim’s testimony), with Ivy v. Tennessee, No. W2003-00786-CCa-R3-DD, 2004 WL 
3021146 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2004) (holding in part that the trial court abused its discretion in 
applying forfeiture by wrongdoing where, although defendant had made statements supporting his intent 
to kill victim if she involved the police, proceedings at which victim would testify were “potential” 
future proceedings at the time of the homicide). 
2
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address whether reflexive application of the doctrine undermines other 
constitutional rights.8  Of some note, Giles does not bar states from 
applying forfeiture by wrongdoing reflexively, without finding the 
defendant’s purpose, to admit hearsay statements that do not implicate 
the Confrontation Clause.9  In such cases, a judge could apply forfeiture 
if he or she believed that the defendant more likely than not killed the 
victim, thus making it more likely that a jury would find that the 
defendant killed the victim.10  But whether under the Giles rule 
requiring purpose or under the more expansive rule potentially applied 
to non-testimonial hearsay statements, reflexive application of forfeiture 
by wrongdoing in a homicide case requires a judicial fact-finding that 
the defendant killed the victim, one of the elements of the crime 
charged, before the jury has convicted the defendant.11  This fact-
finding, generally by a preponderance of the evidence,12 then becomes 
part (or, in the case of a state’s expansive application of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing to statements that do not implicate the right to confront 
witnesses, the entire) basis for admitting otherwise inadmissible 
evidence ag
Although some view Giles as a “windfall” for murderers because it 
curtails the reach of reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing 
 8. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376–77 (2008).  However, all nine Justices were united in 
supporting the reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing.  Id.  Justices Scalia, Roberts, Thomas, 
Alito, and Ginsberg were united in the view that defendant must have killed the victim with the 
“purpose” of preventing the victim from being a witness, while Justice Souter—although concurring—
apparently would have required only “intent.”  Id. at 364–65, 379–80.  Justices Breyer, Stevens and 
Kennedy would not have imposed a “purpose” requirement for a finding of forfeiture by wrongdoing 
and would have allowed a more expansive use of the doctrine.  Id. at 405–06. 
 9. Id. at 376. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Michael J. Polelle, The Death of Dying Declarations in a Post-Crawford World, 71 MO. L. 
REV. 285, 308–09 (2006) (discussing circularity of “automatic forfeiture”—e.g., reflexive application 
with no intent or purpose requirement).  Forfeiture by wrongdoing may be used as a ground to admit a 
homicide victim’s statements in a trial against a defendant where the homicide victim was expected to 
testify—e.g., if the victim is killed shortly before the alleged killer’s trial on drug trafficking charges—
as well as in the homicide trial itself.  Compare United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 269–72 (2d 
Cir. 1982) (defendant convicted of drug charges forfeited objections to testimony of witness killed 
during first trial), and State v. Black, 291 N.W.2d 208, 214 (Minn. 1980) (applying forfeiture by 
wrongdoing to admit hearsay statements of witness who refused to testify after she reported that 
defendant threatened her and her family if she testified), with United States v. Vallee, 304 F. App’x 916, 
920 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that homicide for which defendant was charged provided basis for forfeiture 
ruling).  Only the latter provides overlap between the required judicial fact-finding and the jury’s 
required fact-finding. 
 12. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 172 (Mass. 2005) (preponderance); 
People v. Hagos, No. 05CA2296, 2009 WL 3464284, at *22 (Colo. App. Oct. 29, 2009) 
(preponderance).  Cf. People v. Geraci, 85 N.Y.2d 359, 367 (1995) (adopting clear and convincing 
evidence standard in New York). 
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when the Confrontation Clause is implicated,13 this Article suggests that 
the Giles ruling nonetheless fails to resolve an underlying discontinuity 
with the Court’s historical interpretation of a different triumvirate of 
constitutional rights accorded a criminal defendant.  In United States v. 
Gaudin, a unanimous Court held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
demand that every element of the charged crime, and not just the factual 
components of the essential elements, be submitted to a jury for decision 
under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.14  In Gaudin, the Court 
recognized that context could affect whether judicial fact-finding 
violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, Fifth 
Amendment right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and Fifth 
Amendment right to due process.15 
Gaudin’s holding appears facially unrelated to the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine addressed in Giles, but, as this Article discusses, 
Giles’s continued approval of the reflexive application of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing implicates the very core of Gaudin’s holding because the 
Court did not consider the context of forfeiture by wrongdoing and how 
that differs from the context of preliminary questions of evidentiary 
admissibility, which are ordinarily appropriately allocated to the judge 
for decision.  This Article suggests that reflexive application of the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine cannot be easily reconciled with 
Gaudin’s holding or its reasoning, and considers the extent to which it 
undermines the constitutional rights linked by the Court in Gaudin.  Part 
II discusses the rights linked by Gaudin.  Part III then addresses 
forfeiture by wrongdoing and its recent expansion to the reflexive case, 
while Part IV closely examines Giles.  Part V considers the Supreme 
Court’s authorization of reflexive application.  Finally, Part VI 
concludes that the allocation of fact-finding to judges in the reflexive 
case violates the constitutional principles addressed by Gaudin. 
 13. Lininger, The Sound of Silence, supra note 5, at 863–64 (calling decision a “windfall” for 
some defendants and discussing authorities predicting that Giles will have dire consequences for 
domestic abuse prosecutions). 
 14. Gaudin v. United States, 515 U.S. 506, 511–12, 522–23 (1995).  The Court explained that the 
context might dictate allocation to the judge if a preliminary question of the admissibility of evidence, 
such as whether evidence should be excluded as seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but to the 
jury “when it is one of the elements of the crime of depriving a person of constitutional rights under 
color of law . . . .”  Id. at 521. 
 15. Id. at 510, 511 n.1, 522–23.  See also Colleen P. Murphy, Context and the Allocation of 
Decisionmaking: Reflections on United States v. Gaudin, 82 VA. L. REV. 961, 964 (1996) (arguing that 
the Court’s use of “the context of ‘elements of the offense’ to determine whether certain questions must 
be decided by the jury” is “too narrow” and led to the Court’s unsupported allocation of offense-related 
sentencing factors to the court rather than the jury). 
4
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS LINKED BY GAUDIN 
In Gaudin, the Supreme Court held that the interrelated nature of the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments requires every element of a criminal charge 
be submitted to the jury for determination by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.16  The issue in Gaudin was whether the Constitution required a 
trial judge to submit to the jury the question of the “materiality” of a 
false statement in a criminal prosecution for making “material false 
statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.”17  
Before the Supreme Court, the government argued that materiality was a 
“legal” question, and therefore, was not a factual component of an 
essential element of the crime that must be presented to the jury.18 
Led by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the 
government’s position finding first that the inquiry into materiality was 
the sort of “‘mixed question of law and fact’ . . . [that] has typically been 
resolved by juries,” and second, there was no case law leaving the jury 
with only factual questions and removing from the jury the ultimate 
application of law to fact.19  Any “device,” such as a statutory inference 
or presumption, passes constitutional muster only if it does “‘not 
undermine the factfinder’s responsibility at trial, based on evidence 
adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable 
doubt.’”20 
To reach its holding, the Court first reaffirmed the linkage of two 
important constitutional rights—the Fifth Amendment right to due 
process and the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial—noting its prior 
holding in Sullivan v. Louisiana21 that “these provisions require criminal 
convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty 
of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”22  Implicit in this language is the Court’s recognition 
that, as put by the Sullivan Court: 
the Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
 16. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522–23. 
 17. Id. at 507.  The defendant, a real estate broker and developer, was charged with equity-
skimming and making false statements on loan settlement statements and appraisal report forms in 
violation of federal law.  United States v. Gaudin, 986 F.2d 1267, 1269–70 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d 515 
U.S. 506 (1995).  The crime of making false statements to a federal agency was governed by 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1001 (1988), which was interpreted as containing an element of materiality.  Gaudin, 986 F.2d at 
1271. 
 18. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 511–12.  See also Murphy, supra note 15, at 965. 
 19. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 512–13. 
 20. Id. at 514–15 (quoting Court of Ulster County. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979)). 
 21. 508 U.S. 275, 277–78 (1993). 
 22. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 510. 
5
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and the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury verdict are interrelated.  
It would not satisfy the Sixth Amendment to have a jury determine that 
the defendant is probably guilty, and then leave it up to the judge to 
determine (as Winship requires) whether he is guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.23 
The Court emphasized the historical importance of the right to a jury 
trial, tracing its “impressive pedigree” to England, where the right was 
viewed as “‘the great bulwark of their civil and political liberties.’”24  
The Court also completed the task of repudiating its 1929 decision in 
Sinclair v. United States, which had held that in a prosecution for 
criminal contempt of a witness before Congress who refused to answer a 
“pertinent” question, “pertinency” was a question of law for the court.25 
The Gaudin Court reasoned that the context of a fact determination is 
important to evaluating the constitutionality of allocations between 
judge and jury.26  Justice Scalia emphasized that “the same mixed 
question of law and fact” could be appropriately allocated to “the court 
for one purpose, and to the jury for another.”27  If probable cause “arises 
in the context of a motion to suppress,” it is appropriately allocated to 
the judge.28  But if probable cause is an element of the crime charged, 
then it is for the jury.29 
The Court also distinguished Kungys v. United States, which had held 
that the question of materiality in a denaturalization proceeding could be 
decided by an appellate court rather than by the trial court on remand,30 
noting that the context of the fact-finding function was different.31  
Kungys was focused on whether an appellate court could decide the 
question in a non-jury denaturalization proceeding, while Gaudin 
concerned the constitutionality of a court finding of materiality in a 
criminal jury trial.32  Additionally, Kungys involved a proceeding at 
which no Sixth Amendment right attached.33  The Court concluded that 
unlike Kungys, Gaudin had a constitutional right to have the jury decide 
materiality because materiality was an element of the crime charged, and 
 23. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 278. 
 24. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 510 (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 541 n.2 (4th ed. 1873)). 
 25. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 (1929). 
 26. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 521. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. 485 U.S. 759, 772 (1988). 
 31. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
6
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the Sixth Amendment right attached to the criminal proceeding.34 
The Court’s emphasis on the interrelationship between the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments and its discussion of the characterization of the 
context or purpose of the finding to be put to judge or jury is significant 
when considering reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing.  
That is because Gaudin confirmed that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
work together to address who decides the defendant’s guilt—the jury—
as well as what the jury decides—whether the government has 
persuaded the jury “beyond a reasonable doubt” of the facts establishing 
each element of the criminal charge.35  This suggests that judicial acts 
that have the effect of lessening the prosecution’s burden of proof on 
any element of the crime charged could under some circumstances 
undermine, if not violate outright, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 
Thus, under Gaudin, a critical issue in determining the 
constitutionality of an allocation of judicial fact-finding is the way in 
which one frames the context of the determination to be made.  If one 
characterizes a probable cause finding as a preliminary evidentiary 
ruling, one result follows—the judge decides; if one characterizes it as 
an element of the crime charged, then another follows—the jury decides.  
Accordingly, the context of the fact-finding is an important measure of 
the constitutionality of the judge–jury allocation.  Thus, the context in 
which reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing arises, and the 
ways in which that context demonstrates that forfeiture by wrongdoing 
differs from questions of evidentiary competence, are important 
considerations if the integrity of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments is to 
be wholly preserved.36  When context is considered, the Gaudin Court’s 
example of probable cause being a judge question when used to 
determine the admissibility of evidence but being a jury question when it 
is an element of the crime37 does not provide a satisfying explanation of 
why the reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing is 
constitutionally sound.38  Because, as discussed infra in Part V.A., the 
 34. Id. at 511. 
 35. Id. at 510–11; Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277–78 (1993). 
 36. Murphy, supra note 15, at 964–65, 984–85 (arguing that in some “respects, the Supreme 
Court misuses context as a substitute for sound reasoning [leading to] a usurpation of the jury’s 
constitutional province” and calling for “more analysis and less unexplained reliance on context” to 
“bring needed precision to the often difficult task of allocating decisionmaking between judge and 
jury”). 
 37. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 521. 
 38. See Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 2, at 522–23 (describing the fact-finding as an evidentiary 
one when being used to apply forfeiture by wrongdoing and as substantive when being used to 
determine guilt or innocence).  Professor Murphy notes that judicial allocation of evidentiary issues is 
based on the “intention to enhance the reliability of the factfinding process,” while judicial allocation of 
pretrial issues is justified by the collateral nature of pretrial issues or the object of keeping “from the jury 
7
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forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine does not address evidentiary 
competence, the Court’s and scholars’ analogy to preliminary questions 
of evidentiary admissibility has troubling implications for important 
constitutional principles. 
Although forfeiture by wrongdoing is a rule of equity that does not 
evaluate the competence of evidence, clearly it affects the admissibility 
of evidence.39  That it does so should be troubling when the doctrine is 
applied reflexively in homicide cases to admit evidence that makes a 
conviction more likely.40  The Supreme Court has long distinguished 
evidence that may be admitted at a jury trial from evidence that may be 
used in other proceedings, on the ground that the rules of evidence are 
linked to the reasonable doubt standard, such that the prosecutor’s proof 
must be made “by evidence confined to that which long experience in 
the common-law tradition, to some extent embodied in the Constitution, 
has crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with that standard.”41  
The evidence rules themselves are largely exclusionary and have been 
matters on which reasonable people could differ.”  Murphy, supra note 15, at 976–77.  These 
justifications do not support judicial allocation of the decision-making when applying forfeiture by 
wrongdoing reflexively in homicide cases.  The doctrine’s application to hearsay objections eliminates a 
screen against the admission of unreliable evidence; the required fact-findings are closely intertwined 
with the jury’s purpose of determining guilt or innocence of homicide; and the object of the doctrine is 
not to keep matters from the jury. 
 39. Application of forfeiture by wrongdoing does not require any assessment of the competence 
of the evidence sought to be introduced.  Others have questioned whether the competence of that 
evidence should be an implied requirement of the doctrine.  See, e.g., Anthony Bocchino & David 
Sonenshein, Rule 804(b)(6) – The Illegitimate Child of The Failed Liaison Between the Hearsay Rule 
and Confrontation Clause, 73 MO. L. REV. 41, 41 (2008). 
 40. This proposition would find support even were forfeiture by wrongdoing merely a 
preliminary question of evidentiary admissibility.  As Professor Stephen Salzburg pointed out, different 
preliminary fact questions present different risks to the reliability of the verdict.  Stephen A. Salzburg, 
Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 STAN. L. REV. 271, 275 (1975).  Professor 
Salzburg recognized that the closer the unity between the judicial fact-finding required for a preliminary 
fact-finding and the jury’s fact-finding, the greater the risk that an error in the preliminary fact-finding 
will produce an unreliable verdict.  Id. at 283.  However, he concluded that most preliminary fact-
findings were appropriately decided by the judge using the preponderance of the evidence standard, for 
“few cases actually involve a coincidence between preliminary facts and ultimate issues; one must 
actually strain to find such cases.  Thus in the typical case we need not fear that the preliminary fact 
question is the twin of the ultimate fact question.”  Id. at 291–92.  Reflexive application of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing, if it were appropriately characterized as merely a preliminary question of evidentiary 
admissibility, would be that rare case.  While Professor Salzburg advocated applying a higher standard 
of proof to preliminary questions of admissibility in some situations where the judge and jury were to 
decide the same facts, adjusting the standard of proof to be applied to judicial fact-finding would not 
completely address the question of whether a court may sanction the defendant for the conduct for which 
he is brought before the jury by reducing the burden on the government.  See id. at 305 (recommending 
higher standard for confessions, dying declarations, and some declarations against interest). 
 41. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949) (affirming trial court’s consideration of 
evidence at hearing seeking suppression of evidence seized during a search of the defendant’s vehicle) 
(emphasis added). 
8
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described by the Court as “historically grounded rights of our system, 
developed to safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with 
resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property.”42  It logically follows 
that the erroneous admission of outcome determinative evidence is 
grounds to vacate a criminal conviction.43  If forfeiture by wrongdoing 
is more than a preliminary question of evidentiary admissibility, its 
expansion of the scope of admissible evidence threatens the integrity of 
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.44  Its employment in a 
homicide case to admit victim hearsay evidence is intended to admit 
important, likely outcome determinative evidence.45  Applied 
reflexively, forfeiture by wrongdoing intertwines the judge’s fact-
finding with the jury’s fact-finding.  Therefore, a subsequent guilty 
verdict could be used to justify even an erroneous judicial fact-finding 
on one or more of the same factu 46
III. FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING 
A. Two Objections Lost 
Whether under a common law or statutory construct, forfeiture by 
wrongdoing deprives the defendant of the constitutional right to confront 
a witness and objections to the admission of hearsay evidence.  The 
doctrine thus may be applied to bar a criminal defendant from objecting 
to the admission of hearsay evidence on the ground that the defendant’s 
constitutional right, to confront a witness has been forfeited.  However, 
the doctrine may also be applied to bar any litigant—such as a civil 
 42. Id. at 174. 
 43. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 302 (1991); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986).  
See also Margaret A. Berger, When, If Ever, Does Evidentiary Error Constitute Reversible Error?, 25 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 893 (1992) (discussing instances of non-constitutional evidentiary error that led to 
reversal). 
 44. See Edward J. Imwinkelreid, Trial Judges Gatekeepers or Usurpers?  Can the Trial Judge 
Critically Assess the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Without Invading the Jury’s Province to 
Evaluate the Credibility and Weight of the Testimony?, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2000) (discussing 
early American shift away from allocating preliminary findings of fact to judges due to the risk that 
judges could use such findings to dictate trial outcomes, thus undermining the jury’s power). 
 45. Larry King Live: Drew Peterson Arrested in Connection with Death of Third Wife (CNN 
television broadcast, May 7, 2009), transcript available at http://archives.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/ 
0905/07/lkl.01.html (discussing likelihood that, if victim hearsay is admitted through forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine, jury will convict). 
 46. In State v. Fry, the Ohio Supreme Court expressed the view that the defendant’s conviction 
of aggravated homicide for killing a witness (rendered upon evidence including statements admitted by 
reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing) supported the conclusion that the trial court correctly 
determined that the defendant killed the victim with the intent of preventing her from being a witness 
against him.  926 N.E.2d 1239, 1262 (Ohio 2010). 
9
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litigant for whom no constitutional right to confront witnesses exists—
from invoking the rule against hearsay.47 
The rule that hearsay is inadmissible and the constitutional right to 
confront witnesses are related because they protect similar interests, but, 
as illustrated above by the difference between civil and criminal 
litigants, they are not identical or coextensive.  In Crawford v. 
Washington, the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars 
the admission of un-confronted “testimonial” statements, such as 
statements made to a police officer investigating a crime, testimony in 
depositions or in court, and sworn affidavits.48  Non-testimonial 
statements, such as statements made to friends or family members or 
statements made in emergency situations (such as on a 911 call), 
ordinarily may be admitted without raising Confrontation Clause 
concerns, although the Court left open whether the admission of non-
testimonial statements could ever violate the right to confront 
witnesses.49  The right to confront witnesses thus may provide a basis 
for excluding from evidence even those hearsay statements that fall 
within an exception to the rule against hearsay, but only if the statement 
is testimonial.  Thus, under a Confrontation Clause analysis of forfeiture 
by wrongdoing, the forfeiture is of the right to confront, which applies to 
testimonial hearsay statements.50 
In comparison with the right to confront witnesses, objections to the 
admission of hearsay evidence provide both civil and criminal litigants 
with the opportunity to seek exclusion of hearsay statements that do not 
fall within the jurisdiction’s recognized exceptions to the rule against 
hearsay.51 
As discussed more fully in the following subpart, the doctrine of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing has evolved considerably from its common 
 47. See, e.g., Proffit v. State, 191 P.3d 963, 967 (Wyo. 2008).  Some states have not applied 
forfeiture by wrongdoing to admit statements that do not meet an exception to the rule against hearsay, 
but the Federal Rules of Evidence and many state courts apply forfeiture by wrongdoing both to the 
right to confront witnesses and to the defendant’s ability to assert hearsay objections.  See, e.g., People 
v. Hagos, No. 05CA2296, 2009 WL 3464284, at *21 (Colo. App. Oct. 29, 2009) (holding that the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine did not permit admission of evidence otherwise inadmissible under 
Colorado’s evidence rules), cert. denied, No. 10SC192, 2010 WL 3529276 (Col. Sept. 13, 2010). 
 48. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 
822 (2006). 
 49. Davis, 547 U.S. at 829. 
 50. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60–61; Davis, 547 U.S. at 822–23.  The Crawford Court cast doubt on 
its prior refusal to confine the Confrontation Clause to testimonial statements, but because the statement 
at issue was testimonial under any definition of the term, the Court did not reach the question of whether 
a non-testimonial statement’s admission could ever violate the Confrontation Clause.  Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 60–61. 
 51. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803, 804 (2010). 
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law roots.  Modern rules, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), 
have expanded the common law forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine to 
encompass forfeiture not only of the right to confront but also of 
evidentiary objections to otherwise inadmissible hearsay, making it 
possible to admit hearsay statements under the doctrine without regard 
for whether those statements meet an exception to the rule against 
hearsay.52  The doctrine has also been expanded to encompass the 
admission of statements of victims who might have been witnesses in a 
future, potential, or unrelated proceeding. 
B. Evolution to an Expanded Doctrine 
Modern forfeiture by wrongdoing rules are deeply rooted in the 
common law.  The Supreme Court has traced the doctrine’s origins trace 
to Lord Morley’s Case, in which the English Court admitted a witness’s 
hearsay statements where the witness was “‘detained by the means or 
procurement of the prisoner.’”53  In 1879, the United States Supreme 
Court first addressed the doctrine in Reynolds v. United States.54  The 
Court upheld the trial court’s finding that a defendant in a criminal 
bigamy case forfeited his right to confront his alleged second wife where 
the trial court had heard evidence on the issue and concluded that the 
defendant had kept her from being subpoenaed.55  The Court announced 
the principle, long applied in England, that “[t]he Constitution does not 
guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his 
own wrongful acts.  It grants him the privilege of being confronted with 
the witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses 
away, he cannot insist on his privilege.”56  In Reynolds, as in the 
preceding authorities supporting the doctrine, the defendant stood 
accused of a crime other than the act of making the witness 
 52. Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Crawford, the right to confront and the right to object 
to hearsay arguably were coextensive, but Crawford’s ruling that only the admission of testimonial 
statements violates the Confrontation Clause made clear that although they may share the same roots, 
the rule against hearsay is separate and not coextensive with the right to confront witnesses.  Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 50, 68.  A non-testimonial statement that is not admissible under any other exception to the 
rule against hearsay may be admitted under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine if state law allows.  
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008).  Compare Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 989 A.2d 883, 
900, 900 n.11 (Pa. 2010) (noting that under the Pennsylvania evidence rules, forfeiture by wrongdoing 
extinguishes hearsay objections and the right to confront witnesses), with Hagos, 2009 WL 3464284, at 
*21 (noting that in Colorado, forfeiture by wrongdoing does not extinguish hearsay objections). 
 53. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359 (2008) (quoting Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 
769, 770–71 (H.L. 1666)). 
 54. 98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
 55. Id. at 159–60. 
 56. Id. at 158. 
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unavailable.57  To determine whether the defendant had made the 
witness unavailable, the trial court did not need to determine any facts 
that were elements of the crime for which the defendant stood trial.  The 
Reynolds Court considered forfeiture to be a rule of equity that 
prevented a party from gaining a tactical advantage at trial through acts 
designed to thwart the prosecution’s ability to bring witnesses against 
him.58 
After Reynolds, forfeiture by wrongdoing received little attention 
until the early 1980s.59  Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6),60 entitled 
“Forfeiture by Wrongdoing,” was approved by the Supreme Court in 
1997.  The Rule was drafted in response to a perception that witness 
intimidation had increasingly thwarted criminal prosecutions.61  The 
Rule permits the admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay 
statements, including both testimonial and non-testimonial statements, if 
a party has “engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, 
 57. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 160 (1878) (finding evidence to support the 
conclusion that defendant caused witness, his wife, to be away during bigamy trial); Williams v. State, 
19 Ga. 402, 402 (1856) (affirming admission of absent witness’s “written memorandum” where 
defendant, on trial for larceny, induced complaining larceny victim to stay away from trial; witness’s 
prior statement was confronted so no Confrontation Clause issue was implicated); Queen v. Scaife, 117 
Eng. Rep. 1271, 1273 (1851) (noting that there was evidence that defendant caused witness to be 
unavailable at defendant’s robbery trial); Rex v. Barber, 1 Root 76, 76 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1775) (noting 
that defendant caused witness to remain away from his trial for counterfeiting and other charges); 
Harrison’s Case, 12 How. St. Tr. 833, 851 (H.L. 1692) (noting that witness was bribed to stay away 
from defendant’s trial). 
 58. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159 (“[I]f a witness is absent by [defendant’s] own wrongful 
procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to supply the place of that which he 
has kept away.  The Constitution does not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate 
consequences of his own wrongful acts.  It grants him the privilege of being confronted with the 
witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege.  
If, therefore, when absent by his procurement, their evidence is supplied in some lawful way, he is in no 
condition to assert that his constitutional rights have been violated.”). 
 59. In 1976, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals could not identify a single state or federal court 
opinion directly addressing whether a defendant “waived” or forfeited the right to confront a witness 
after engaging in witness intimidation that resulted in the witness being unavailable at trial.  United 
States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1358 (8th Cir. 1976).  The doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing had 
been applied to uphold removing a misbehaving defendant from the trial courtroom and to prevent the 
defendant from claiming constitutional error when he voluntarily absented himself from the courtroom.  
Illinois v Allen, 223 U.S. 337, 342–43 (1970) (removal of defendant); Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 
17, 20 (1973) (defendant voluntarily absent); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912) (defendant 
voluntarily absent).  In 1934, in Snyder v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court noted in dicta that the 
criminal defendant could forfeit the right to confrontation by misconduct—a scenario not present in that 
case.  291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934). 
 60. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6); Leonard Birdsong, The Exclusion of Hearsay Through Forfeiture 
By Wrongdoing–Old Wine in a New Bottle–Solving the Mystery of Codification of the Concept into 
Federal Rule 804(b)(6), 80 NEB. L. REV. 891, 903–04 (2001) (discussing motivations for the new rule, 
including pressure from the Department of Justice, along with the perception that it was becoming more 
difficult to prosecute federal crimes due to witness intimidation and murders). 
 61. Id. 
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and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.”62  The 
Rule was intended to deter witness “intimidation” and other conduct 
designed to thwart the prosecution of crimes, a significant problem in 
“organized crime and drug prosecutions.”63 
The Advisory Committee intended that courts would be the arbiters of 
whether the declarant’s hearsay statement is admissible under Rule 
804(b)(6) by employing Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), which 
provides that the court decides questions of evidentiary admissibility.64  
As drafted, Rule 804(b)(6) addresses both hearsay statements and the 
right to confront witnesses.65  It permits admission of otherwise 
inadmissible hearsay when the declarant is unavailable and the 
defendant caused or acquiesced in wrongdoing intended to and having 
the effect of making the declarant unavailable.66  It does so without 
regard to the nature or reliability of the declarant’s hearsay statements.67  
The Rule does not distinguish between testimonial and non-testimonial 
statements and allows courts to admit hearsay to which the 
Confrontation Clause does not apply.68  Thus, the plain language of the 
Rule is more expansive than the constitutional common law doctrine.  
However, its breadth is not unlimited, being constrained by the high 
court’s jurisprudence on the permissible scope of forfeiture of the right 
to confront a witness. 
A number of states have codified the common law rule in their rules 
of evidence,69 while others continue to apply the common law rule 
 62. Id. 
 63. James F. Flanagan, Confrontation, Equity, and the Misnamed Exception for ‘Forfeiture’ by 
Wrongdoing, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1193, 1197 n.19 (2006) (citations omitted). 
 64. James Flanagan, Forfeiture By Wrongdoing And Those Who Acquiesce In Witness 
Intimidation: A Reach Exceeding Its Grasp And Other Problems With Federal Rule of Evidence 
804(b)(6), 51 DRAKE L. REV. 459, 520–26 (2003) [hereinafter Flanagan, Reach]; FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
 65. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Flanagan, Reach, supra note 64, at 520–26 (2003) (discussing lack of reliability 
requirement). 
 68. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (2010). 
 69. See, e.g., CAL. R. EVID. § 1350 (2002) (providing hearsay exception for certain types of 
victim statements in serious felony cases); DEL. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (2001) (same as federal rule); HAW. 
R. EVID. 804(b)(7) (2009) (no intent required for forfeiture); KY. R. EVID. 804(b)(5) (2009) (same as 
federal rule); MD. R. EVID. 5-804(b)(5)(B) (2009) (limiting application of exception in criminal cases); 
MICH. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (2009) (same as federal rule); N.D. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (2009) (same); OHIO 
R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (2001) (same); OR. R. EVID. 804 (3)(g) (2009) (same); PENN. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) 
(same); TENN. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (1999) (same); VT R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (2004) (same).  Alabama, 
Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming 
do not have a rule of evidence recognizing forfeiture by wrongdoing as a hearsay exception; however, 
those states may apply the common law rule.  Bocchino & Sonenshein, supra note 39, at 79–80. 
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announced in Reynolds in one form or another.70  Only a few states 
require the court to find forfeiture by wrongdoing by the clear and 
convincing evidence standard,71 with the majority permitting proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence.72  Many require a pretrial hearing before 
forfeiture may be applied.73 
C. Crawford’s Promotion of Reflexive Application 
Although courts rarely applied forfeiture by wrongdoing reflexively 
before Crawford v. Washington,74 the Crawford Court’s re-working of 
the Confrontation Clause test encouraged its use in homicide cases.  
Before Crawford, if a victim’s statement fell within a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception or had particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, 
admission of that statement was not a violation of the Confrontation 
Clause.75  After Crawford, however, the hearsay inquiry no longer 
resolved the Confrontation Clause inquiry; the proper inquiry became 
whether an un-confronted statement was “testimonial.”76  As a result of 
Crawford’s major reassessment of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, a 
victim’s testimonial statements would be inadmissible even if they fell 
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or were accompanied by 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.  For example, a victim’s 
 70. See, e.g., State v. Poole, 232 P.3d 519, 524–25 (Utah 2010) (common law doctrine of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing); State v. Fry, 926 N.E.2d 1239, 1262 (Ohio 2010) (common law doctrine); 
Hunt v. State, 218 P.3d 516, 519 (Okl. Crim. App. 2009) (C. Johnson, P.J., concurring) (common law 
doctrine applies to Confrontation Clause, but no rule of evidence exists). 
 71. See, e.g., People v. McCrae, 895 N.Y.S.2d 101, 102–03 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (noting that 
court must find by clear and convincing evidence that defendant was “involved” in the murder); State v. 
Mason, 162 P.3d 396, 404 (Wash. 2007) (“clear, cogent, and convincing” standard). 
 72. See, e.g., State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330, 440–41 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) 
(adopting preponderance standard, reasoning that wrongdoing “is invariably accompanied by tangible 
evidence such as . . . the murder of a key witness, and there is hardly any reason to apply a burden of 
proof which might encourage behavior which strikes at the heart of the system itself”). 
 73. See, e.g., People v. Hagos, No. 05CA2296, 2009 WL 3464284, at *19 (Colo. App. Oct. 29, 
2009) (hearing required in Colorado), cert. denied, No. 10SC192, 2010 WL 3529276 (Col. Sept. 13, 
2010); People v. Cotto, 642 N.Y.S.2d 790, 793 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (Sirois hearing in New York). 
 74. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  See United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding 
forfeiture by wrongdoing based on defendant’s alleged killing of federal informant, for which defendant 
was on trial).  The Eighth Circuit found that the defendant would “benefit” from having killed the victim 
to prevent her testimony in another case if forfeiture was not applied.  Id.  Professor Polelle points out 
that the fallacy in this argument is that the victim is never a witness at a homicide trial; the benefit to the 
defendant only would accrue in the trial at which the victim would have testified had she been alive.  
Polelle, supra note 11, at 310 (noting “illogic[ ]” of reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing, 
for “[t]he definition of criminal homicide presupposes the unavailability of the witness; therefore, one 
cannot intentionally procure the unavailability of a victim whose unavailability because of death is a 
necessary part of the crime”). 
 75. Roberts v. Ohio, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
 76. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004). 
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statement to a police officer that the defendant had threatened to kill her 
might meet a number of hearsay exceptions, such as the exception for 
excited utterances.  Prior to Crawford, the statement may have been 
admissible; however, after Crawford, if the statement were deemed 
testimonial, then it would have been excluded as violating the 
defendant’s right to confront witnesses. 
Crawford has been found to have had a profound effect on domestic 
violence prosecutions, including homicide cases related to domestic 
violence, because the admission of statements within a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception or made under circumstances that supported their 
reliability was now foreclosed as a violation of the defendant’s rights 
under the Confrontation Clause.77  The use of forfeiture by wrongdoing 
in homicide cases is now commonly invoked as a legitimate means of 
avoiding Crawford’s ill-effects on domestic violence prosecutions.78  
However, Crawford also affected the prosecutions of other homicides, 
such as those in which the victim lived long enough to speak to 
 77. Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747 (2005) [hereinafter 
Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers] (presenting data reflecting dramatic detrimental effect of Crawford and 
recommending, among other needed reforms, that “[a]ll states should codify the doctrine of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing,” which should be construed to allow admission of even victim hearsay statements that do 
not fall within a recognized hearsay exception).  See also Carol A. Chase, Is Crawford a “Get Out of 
Jail Free” Card for Batterers and Abusers?  An Argument for a Narrow Definition of “Testimonial,” 84 
OR. L. REV. 1093 (2005).  The amicus brief of the Battered Women’s Justice Project and Other 
Domestic Violence Organizations in Giles further highlights the problem: 
  The realities of battering and domestic violence homicides have forced prosecutors to 
be resourceful in identifying and obtaining a variety of evidence to prove the guilt of a 
murderer.  Recognizing the unique characteristics presented by domestic violence 
homicides, prosecutors have developed “evidence-based” prosecution.  Evidence-based 
prosecution emphasizes the gathering of reliable evidence, such as 911 tapes, 
photographs, medical records, admissions by a defendant, statements of relatives or 
neighbors, and police observations, in order to build a case that does not depend upon the 
participation of the victim.  Utilizing long-accepted exceptions for excited utterances, 
medical treatment statements, and present sense impressions, prosecutors attempt to hold 
batterers accountable for their criminal conduct, even in the absence of the victim. 
Amicus Curiae Brief of the Battered Women’s Justice Project and Other Domestic Violence 
Organizations in Support of Respondent at 11–12, Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008) (No. 07-
6053). 
 78. To a large extent, Professor Friedman recommended this approach long before Crawford, 
when he wrote: 
  Under the approach I suggest, the fact that a statement fits within an exception to the 
rule against hearsay would not take the statement over the confrontation barrier.  Thus, 
the traditional exception for dying declarations would not defeat a confrontation claim.  
But notice how sensible application of the forfeiture principle takes up the slack left by 
the absence of the dying declaration exception—reaching the same result in most cases, 
but not in all, and operating on a far more justifiable basis. 
Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 2, at 526. 
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investigating police officers but died before the perpetrator was tried.79 
Before Crawford, few courts had considered the reflexive application 
of forfeiture by wrongdoing.80  The majority of courts that had 
considered whether to apply forfeiture by wrongdoing reflexively 
favored application of the rule.81  The rationale for applying the rule in 
this way was that having killed the victim, the defendant would benefit 
in his homicide trial if permitted to object to the admission of the 
victim’s hearsay statements.82 
For example, in United States v. Natson,83 where the district court 
could 
discern no reason that a homicide victim’s statements should not be 
admissible if the party against whom the statements are to be used 
committed the homicide, at least in part, to prevent the victim’s 
testimony.  It would be folly to exclude such evidence, and yet admit into 
evidence in a homicide case hearsay statements of a witness (not the 
victim of the underlying crime) who the defendant threatened and scared 
into leaving the country.84 
However, the court declined to rule on the admissibility of the 
statements, finding that a hearing was necessary to establish that the 
defendant had intended to make the victim unavailable as a witness.85  
The flaw in this logic is that there is a significant difference between a 
criminal defendant, who seeks to thwart the progress of the trial by 
keeping witnesses from coming to that trial, and the criminal defendant 
 79. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 114, 116–17, 124–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) 
(finding forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine appropriate where shooting victim described shooter to 
police officer responders and later died from wounds, on ground that defendant intended to “silence” 
victims). 
 80. Flanagan, Reach, supra note 64, at 544 (pointing out that in the twenty-five years before 
2003, forfeiture by wrongdoing was only invoked in approximately seventy-five cases); United States v. 
Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1358 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding no state or federal case directly applying 
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in instance of witness intimidation). 
 81. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2005) (but whether defendant 
killed victim not in dispute); United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Cubie, No. 05-CR-146, 2007 WL 3223299 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 26, 2007); United States v. Natson, 469 F. 
Supp. 2d 1243 (M.D. Ga. 2006); United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961 (S.D. Ohio 2005); State 
v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004); Gonzalez v. State, 155 S.W.3d 603 (Tex. App. 2004); People v. 
Moore, 117 P.3d 1 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d 518 (Wis. 2007). 
 82. As others have noted, this rationale is not logical because the victim is never available to 
testify at the homicide trial.  Polelle, supra note 11, at 310. 
 83. 469 F. Supp. 2d 1243 (M.D. Ga. 2006). 
 84. Id. at 1250–51. 
 85. Id. at 1252.  The court noted that the rule “is not designed to provide an additional sanction 
for the homicide of someone who may have been a witness had they not been killed” and that to satisfy 
the exception’s purpose of denying the defendant the benefit of “intentionally eliminating a witness” and 
“to deter parties from seeking to eliminate witnesses . . . there must be some connection between the 
party’s motive and his elimination of the witness.”  Id. 
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being tried for killing an individual, whatever the motive.86 
In State v. Jensen,87 a highly-publicized88 homicide case in which 
defendant stood trial for murdering his wife with antifreeze, the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin likewise upheld the application of the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine to admit the deceased wife’s hearsay 
statements.89  A letter from Jensen’s wife to detectives stating that the 
defendant was her probable killer in the event of her early demise was 
held to be testimonial.90  The court adopted a broad construction of the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, holding that intent to make the victim 
unavailable as a witness was not a necessary component of the doctrine, 
and remanded the case for a determination of whether Jensen “caused 
[his wife’s] unavailability, thereby forfeiting his right to 
confrontation.”91  In its analysis, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was 
swayed by the reasoning of Professor Friedman and numerous courts 
that the defendant’s motive was irrelevant to whether the defendant 
would “benefit through his own wrongdoing if such a witness’s 
statements could not be used against him.”92 
But, not all courts accepted the proposition that the alleged homicide 
to prevent a witness from testifying in a proceeding should give rise to 
an adverse evidentiary ruling in a subsequent criminal prosecution for 
the alleged homicide.  Those that rejected the reflexive application of 
 86. In the wake of Crawford, forfeiture by wrongdoing also has been expanded to what this 
Article calls the hybrid case in which the defendant allegedly killed the victim during the commission of 
a crime, such as robbery, ostensibly so that there would be no witnesses to that crime.  See e.g., 
Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 114, 125 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (It is “logical [to infer that] appellant 
killed the Herreras because he wanted to steal their truck and their money, and he didn’t want any 
witnesses to his crime—especially witnesses that knew him, and knew where to find him.”). 
 87. 727 N.W.2d 518 (Wis. 2007). 
 88. The trial, including the victim’s letter to detectives that was ultimately admitted under the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception, received national news coverage.  See, e.g., ABC Primetime Live 
(ABC television broadcast July 3, 2008), transcript available at 2008 WLNR 12479020 (Westlaw); 
Carrie Antlfinger, Wife: I ‘Fear For My Early Demise’; Defense: Letter Was an Attempt to Frame, CHI. 
TRIB., Jan. 8, 2008, at 4; ABC 20/20 (ABC television broadcast Mar. 1, 2008), transcript available at 
2008 WLNR 4218022 (Westlaw).  During the 20/20 interview, Special Prosecutor Robert Jambois 
stated that prosecuting the case would be “very difficult without the letter coming in.”  Id. 
 89. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d at 535. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 521.  On remand, the trial court found that the defendant had caused the witness to be 
unavailable and admitted the letter at trial.  Carrie Antlfinger, Jensen Convicted of Murder, WIS. ST. J., 
Feb. 22, 2008 (First ed.), at B1, available at 2008 WLNR 3566541 (Westlaw).  The defendant may 
receive a new trial as a consequence of the Supreme Court’s decision in Giles, which held that intent to 
make the victim unavailable as a witness must be found before the right to confront is deemed forfeited.  
Tom Kertschner, Mark Jensen May Get New Trial in Wife’s Poisoning: U.S. Supreme Court Ruling May 
Bar Letter From Wife, THE MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 26, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 
11972694 (Westlaw). 
 92. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d at 534. 
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forfeiture by wrongdoing in homicide cases expressed concern about 
undermining the defendant’s right to trial by jury—a subject given little, 
if any, insightful discussion in the majority of cases applying forfeiture 
by wrongdoing to victim hearsay in homicide cases. 
In United States v. Lentz,93 Judge Lee of the Eastern District of 
Virginia refused to apply Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) to admit 
the hearsay statements of the victim at her spouse’s murder trial even 
though the victim would have been a witness against her husband in an 
unrelated divorce proceeding.94  Notwithstanding the Rule’s 
requirement that the defendant must have intended to prevent the victim 
from being a witness, the district court expressed concern that 
application of forfeiture by wrongdoing to admit “the testimony of a 
decedent victim for whose death a defendant is on trial” would trample 
the presumption of innocence and the defendant’s right to a jury trial.95  
The court also noted the factual impossibility of finding the victim to be 
a witness within the meaning of Rule 804(b)(6)
[T]he divorce proceeding [in which the victim was expected to be a 
witness] is not the proceeding that will be before this Court.  Defendant is 
on trial for the kidnaping [sic] and murder of Doris Lentz.  Ms. Lentz 
would not be testifying in this case if she were available because 
Defendant could not have been charged with such offense.  Therefore, 
statements made by Ms. Lentz to others are inadmissible under the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule.96 
Several other courts have declined to apply forfeiture by wrongdoing 
reflexively where the defendant disputed having killed the victim97 or 
where there was no evidence that the homicide was motivated by the 
desire to prevent the victim from testifying.98  Those courts cited similar 
 93. 282 F. Supp. 2d 399 (E.D. Va. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds by 383 
F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 94. Id. at 426. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 426–27. 
 97. People v. Gilmore, No. 258334, 2006 WL 744268, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2006) 
(“[T]o allow in the statement where the defendant denies doing the killing can only be done if the Court 
is willing to ignore the presumption of innocence and invade the province of the jury and make a 
preliminary finding of guilt.  This we are unwilling to do.  We are not willing to determine whether a 
defendant is entitled to a right guaranteed him by the Constitution based upon the trial judge’s 
determination of a contested factual issue at trial.”). 
 98. See, e.g., State v. Jordan, No. Crim. 04-CR-229-B, 2005 WL 513501, at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 3, 
2005) (declining to apply forfeiture by wrongdoing reflexively where there was no evidence that victim 
would have been a witness, but stating that the reflexive case where the victim would have been a 
witness to an unrelated proceeding is “archetypical”); State v. Mason, 162 P.3d 396, 412 (Wash. 2007) 
(Sanders, J., dissenting) (stating that application of reflexive forfeiture by wrongdoing violated 
defendant’s presumption of innocence and invaded province of jury by “forcing the judge to decide 
Mason’s guilt prior to his trial”); People v. Maher, 89 N.Y.2d 456, 462 (N.Y. 1997) (holding that 
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concerns about the right to trial by jury.99  One state, Ohio, has enacted a 
rule of evidence that bars the reflexive application of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing to admit homicide victim hearsay statements in the 
prosecution of that homicide.100 
IV. GILES V. CALIFORNIA 
Giles presented the question of whether a criminal defendant forfeited 
the right to confront a witness when there was no evidence that the 
defendant acted with the intention of preventing the declarant from 
testifying.101  The defendant, Dwayne Giles, stood trial for murdering 
his girlfriend, Brenda Avie.  At trial, the government offered statements 
that Avie made to a police officer responding to a domestic violence 
incident.102  The statements were admitted under a state rule of evidence 
rule that permitted the admission of an unavailable declarant’s 
statements describing the “infliction or threat of physical injury on a 
declarant . . . [if the] statements are deemed trustworthy.”103  After 
Giles’s conviction and during the pendency of his appeal, the Supreme 
Court decided Crawford v. Washington,104 which required exclusion of 
testimonial statements such as Avie’s unless the defendant had already 
had an opportunity to confront the witness.105  The California Court of 
Appeal then held that admission of the victim’s hearsay statements at 
Giles’s trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause because Crawford 
recognized a doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, and Giles had 
forfeited his right to confront Avie by murdering her, thereby making 
her unavailable to testify.106  The California Supreme Court affirmed.107 
forfeiture by wrongdoing rule was inapplicable where there was no evidence that defendant intended to 
make the victim unavailable as a witness and the rule was “invoked against a defendant in the very trial 
in which the charge is murder of the unavailable witness”). 
 99. Jordan, 2005 WL 513501, at *6; Mason, 162 P.3d at 412; Maher, 89 N.Y.2d at 462. 
 100. OHIO R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (2001); OHIO R. EVID. 804(b)(6), 2001 STAFF NOTES (2001) 
(“[T]he rule does not apply to statements of the victim in a homicide prosecution concerning the 
homicide . . . .”); State v. McCarley, No. 23607, 2008 WL 375842, at *3 (Ohio App. Feb. 13, 2008) 
(finding trial court’s admission of numerous victim hearsay statements to be error, but harmless, noting, 
“[i]t would be a very strange case indeed if a person murdered another for the purpose of preventing the 
other from testifying in their own murder trial”). 
 101. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 354 (2008). 
 102. Id. at 354–55.  The statements met the requirements of a California exception to the hearsay 
rule but implicated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause because they fit Crawford’s definition 
of testimonial statements. 
 103. Id. at 2682 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. § 1370 (West Supp. 2008)). 
 104. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 105. Id. at 61. 
 106. California v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 847 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
 107. People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 435 (Cal. 2008). 
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the 
judgment, finding that more was required for forfeiture of the right to 
confront than a judicial finding that Giles intentionally killed the 
victim.108  In a plurality opinion,109 Justice Scalia wrote that forfeiture 
by wrongdoing could be applied in a case such as Giles if the trial court 
found that: (1) the defendant killed the victim and (2) at least one 
purpose for the killing was an intent to make the victim unavailable as a 
witness.110  Justice Breyer’s dissent, which was joined by Justice 
Stevens and Justice Kennedy, would have applied the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine more expansively, without requiring any proof of 
the defendant’s purpose.111 
Justice Scalia discussed the original purposes of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing: to remedy conduct that interfered with the ability to try a 
case and deter others from engaging in similar conduct.112  The Court 
acknowledged the potential intersection between the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine and the right to a fair trial: 
[t]he boundaries of the doctrine seem to us intelligently fixed so as to 
avoid a principle repugnant to our constitutional system of trial by jury: 
that those murder defendants whom the judge considers guilty (after less 
than a full trial, mind you, and of course before the jury has pronounced 
guilt) should be deprived of fair-trial rights, lest they benefit from their 
judge-determined wrong.113 
 In concluding that “purpose” or “intent” was required for the 
forfeiture of one’s right to confront witnesses, the Court further noted 
that “a legislature may not ‘punish’ a defendant for his evil acts by 
stripping him of the right to have his guilt in a criminal proceeding 
 108. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 377 (2008). 
 109. Justice Scalia authored the main opinion except for section II-D-2, which took issue with any 
version of forfeiture by wrongdoing that did not have a purpose requirement due to the risk of abridging 
the right to trial by jury.  Id. at 373–74.  Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas filed 
separate opinions concurring with Justice Scalia’s opinion in full.  Justice Souter filed a separate opinion 
concurring in part (except to Part II-D-2), in which Justice Ginsberg joined, id. at 379–80; and Justice 
Breyer filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens and Kennedy joined, id. at 380–406. 
 110. Id. at 377. 
 111. Id. at 387–88 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Notwithstanding the Court’s lack of unity on whether 
knowledge-based intent was sufficient to invoke forfeiture by wrongdoing, it appears that the majority 
of the Justices would permit purpose to be inferred in domestic violence cases.  Id. at 375–76, 380 
(Souter, J., and Ginsberg, J., concurring in part); id. at 384–85 (Breyer, J., Stevens, J., and Kennedy, J., 
dissenting); Ross, supra note 2, at 39. 
 112. “The common-law forfeiture rule was aimed at removing the otherwise powerful incentive 
for defendants to intimidate, bribe, and kill the witnesses against them—in other words, it is grounded in 
‘the ability of courts to protect the integrity of their proceedings.’”  Id. at 373 (plurality opinion) 
(quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 834 (2006)). 
 113. Id. 
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determined by a jury, and on the basis of evidence the Constitution 
deems reliable and admissible.”114  Thus, although its holding focused 
on the right to confront witnesses, the Court implicitly recognized that 
forfeiture by wrongdoing also implicates the right to trial by jury.  The 
plurality’s addition of the “purpose” requirement was an attempt to save 
the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine from violating both the 
Confrontation Clause and the right to trial by jury. 
However, the rationale for the reflexive use of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing—that it is an “exception to ordinary practice” that is 
“needed to protect the integrity of court proceedings,” “based upon 
longstanding precedent,” and “much less expansive than the exception 
proposed by the dissent”—is unpersuasive.115  The Court transformed 
the traditional intent requirement of forfeiture by wrongdoing, which 
was that the defendant acted with a purpose of preventing a witness from 
coming to court, to a motive for the homicide for which he is being 
prosecuted.116  In other words, if a defendant is on trial for homicide and 
a motive for the homicide was to prevent the victim from testifying in 
some proceeding, intent can be found even if the defendant did not seek 
to hinder or prevent the homicide case from proceeding against him.  By 
treating forfeiture by wrongdoing as a “preliminary evidentiary ruling,” 
the plurality sanctioned the very circularity that it claimed the forfeiture 
by wrongdoing rule was “intelligently fixed” to avoid: 
 114. Id. at 374.  Although inviting states to apply forfeiture by wrongdoing expansively to non-
testimonial statements, the Court left open the question of whether admitting unreliable hearsay through 
the doctrine could violate due process.  See id. at 376.  See also Tim Donaldson, Combating 
Victim/Witness Intimidation in Family Violence Cases: A Response to Critics of the “Forfeiture by 
Wrongdoing”, Confrontation Exception Resurrected by the Supreme Court in Crawford and Davis, 44 
Id. L. Rev. 643, 693–94 (2008) (discussing scholars’ concerns about the absence of a reliability 
requirement in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6)). 
 115. Giles, 554 U.S. at 373.  Of note, however, neither of the first two justifications for the rule 
comport with the Court’s recitation of the purpose and history of the rule.  First, when the defendant 
stands trial for homicide, the fact that he or she has killed the victim, if true, has no impact on the ability 
of the court to maintain the integrity of the trial process in that proceeding.  Once the defendant is 
brought before the court and jury for the killing, the reason for the killing is irrelevant to the ability of 
the trial court to conduct the proceedings.  In contrast, when a defendant standing trial for a crime 
prevents a witness from coming to court, the defendant has interfered with the court’s ability to conduct 
the trial.  Second, the longstanding precedent cited by the Court reveals that historically, the rule was not 
used to admit victim statements in homicide trials, but was used when the defendant, on trial for one 
crime, committed a different crime or wrongful act in order to prevent or dissuade a witness from 
appearing at the trial.  Id. at 359. 
 116. The purpose requirement has been interpreted by lower courts to include the defendant’s 
desire to keep the victim from testifying against someone other than the defendant in some other 
proceeding.  See, e.g., Dednam v. Norris, No. 5:06CV00076 WRW/BD, 2008 WL 4006997 (E.D. Ark. 
Aug. 25, 2008) (applying forfeiture by wrongdoing rule where defendant stood trial for murdering 
victim, and the court found that defendant committed the murder in order to prevent victim from 
testifying against defendant’s relative in unrelated armed robbery trial). 
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 We do not say, of course, that a judge can never be allowed to inquire 
into guilt of the charged offense in order to make a preliminary 
evidentiary ruling.  That must sometimes be done under the forfeiture rule 
that we adopt—when, for example, the defendant is on trial for murdering 
a witness in order to prevent his testimony.117 
The plurality must have been aware that adding a purpose element to 
the required judicial fact-finding did not adequately address the 
conundrum of reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing.  
Indeed, Justice Breyer’s dissent118 argued that adding a “purpose” 
requirement was unnecessary, in part because “any forfeiture rule 
requires a judge to determine as a preliminary matter that the 
defendant’s own wrongdoing caused the witness to be absent.”119 
The plurality’s intent requirement does not reach non-testimonial 
victim hearsay, which might be admitted solely based upon a judicial 
finding of guilt before the jury has ever reached a verdict.120  Because 
Crawford and Giles held that the Sixth Amendment right to confront 
reaches only testimonial statements, courts remain free to apply 
forfeiture by wrongdoing to find that a homicide defendant has forfeited 
his right to object to any non-testimonial hearsay evidence.121  Thus, 
“[s]tatements to friends and neighbors about abuse and intimidation, and 
statements to physicians in the course of receiving treatment would be 
excluded, if at all, only by hearsay rules,” and as to such non-testimonial 
hearsay, states “are free to adopt the dissent’s version of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing.”122  Giles thus supports the following legal propositions: 
(1) if a statement is testimonial, then a court may find that the defendant 
has forfeited his right to object under the Confrontation Clause if the 
court determines that the defendant committed the killing and that one 
purpose for the killing was to silence the victim as a potential witness; 
and (2) if a statement is non-testimonial hearsay, a state court may find 
that the defendant forfeited any hearsay objection if the court determines 
that the defendant committed the killing.123  The Court suggested that 
 117. Giles, 554 U.S. at 374 n.6. 
 118. Justice Breyer was joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy.  Id. at 380 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 119. Id. at 403. 
 120. Id. at 376–77 (plurality opinion). 
 121. In State v. Fallentine, 215 P.3d 945, 947 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000), the Washington Court of 
Appeals discussed the state’s expansive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing to non-testimonial 
statements and the more restrictive requirements imposed by Giles on testimonial statements. 
 122. Giles, 554 U.S. at 376. 
 123. Federal courts are constrained by the plain language of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), 
which requires a finding that the defendant procured the unavailability of the witness with the intention 
of preventing the witness from testifying. 
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states may admit non-testimonial statements through reflexive 
application of forfeiture by wrongdoing without regard to the 
unreliability of those statements.124 
The Giles decision has been attacked on one hand as a boon to 
batterers125 and hailed on the other as leaving “plenty . . . to boost the 
hopes among prosecutors and domestic violence advocates about the 
way the decision will be applied in future cases.”126  In the aftermath of 
Giles, some state courts have been receptive toward an expanded 
homicide exception to the rule against hearsay.127  Others have  
permitted “intent” to be inferred from evidence of a pattern of domestic 
violence that culminated in the murder or from the fact that the 
defendant had been charged with domestic violence before the murder 
occurred.128 
 
 124. The federal rule contains an express intent requirement.  FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).  
Application of forfeiture by wrongdoing to admit otherwise inadmissible, nontestimonial statements 
does not follow from the doctrine’s roots as a means of preventing misuse of the right to confront.  
Bocchino & Sonenshein, supra note 39, at 61 (“To the extent that the common law Forfeiture by 
Wrongdoing hearsay exception and its codified exception in Rule 804(b)(6) are rationalized as merely 
an analogue to the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine excusing Confrontation, such analogy is 
misplaced.  Given the differences between the functions of the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay 
rule, and the fact that the Confrontation Clause no longer applies to ‘non-testimonial’ hearsay, it makes 
little sense to argue that forfeiture of the Constitutional right to confront a witness by the criminal 
defendant through cross-examination somehow requires equivalent forfeiture of the reliability and 
trustworthiness requirements of an hearsay exception regarding non-testimonial hearsay.”). 
 125. Lininger, The Sound of Silence, supra note 5, at 862. 
 126. Ross, supra note 2, at 34. 
 127. Roberts v. State, 894 N.E.2d 1018, 1025–26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a party who 
has rendered a witness unavailable for cross-examination through a criminal act, including homicide, 
may not object to the admission of non-testimonial hearsay as inadmissible under the Indiana Rules of 
Evidence, but leaving for “another day” proof of wrongdoing required when defendant disputes killing 
victim); Proffit v. State, 191 P.3d 963, 967 (Wyo. 2008) (noting that defendant tried for conspiracy to 
commit murder of sexual assault victim having affirmed based on Giles that defendant forfeited 
Confrontation Clause right, Wyoming Supreme Court considered “whether, given application of the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, it was also necessary for the State to satisfy a hearsay exception to 
have B.C.’s statement admitted” and concluded, “We think not”). 
 128. See, e.g., State v. MacLaughlin, 265 S.W.3d 257, 272–73 (Mo. 2008) (en banc) (noting that 
victim’s hearsay statements that since their breakup, defendant had stalked her, made threats, and was 
abusive, coupled with charge that defendant had burglarized victim’s home, provided sufficient grounds 
to support trial court finding that defendant intended to make the victim unavailable as a witness); 
People v. Banos, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 476, 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (finding it “reasonable” to infer intent 
from: (1) 911 call victim had made ten months before murder, during which defendant asked whether 
victim wanted “to speak to the police” and repeatedly asked victim whether she was going to talk, and 
(2) multiple later violations of a restraining order). 
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V. JUDICIAL FACT-FINDING FOR FORFEITURE IN HOMICIDE CASES: 
UNDERMINING JURIES? 
Application of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in homicide 
cases to admit the homicide victim’s hearsay against the defendant 
affects the jury verdict by altering the standard of proof.  It does this by 
admitting evidence that would not be admissible if the court did not first 
determine, at a minimum, that the defendant is guilty as charged.  
Gaudin suggests that the context in which one considers the judge–jury 
allocation is important and that preliminary evidentiary admissibility are 
appropriately allocated to the courts.  However, if forfeiture by 
wrongdoing is not properly characterized as merely a preliminary 
question of evidentiary admissibility, but is more properly considered to 
be a sanction, then the constitutional soundness of allocating the 
required fact-finding to the court has received insufficient consideration 
and is not adequately supported by Giles. 
A. Not a Question of Evidentiary Admissibility 
When considering whether the judge/jury fact-finding allocation 
passes constitutional muster, Justice Scalia, in Gaudin, distinguished 
preliminary questions of evidentiary admissibility from elements of the 
criminal offense for purposes of constitutional analysis.129  Thus, “every 
essential ingredient of the crime must be proven to the satisfaction of the 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”130  The Court recognized that juries act 
as more than “mere factfinder[s].”131  Accordingly, devices, such as 
statutory inferences and presumptions, do not pass constitutional muster 
if they “‘undermine the factfinder’s responsibility at trial.’”132 
Thus, if reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing is viewed 
as a preliminary evidentiary ruling, allocation of the fact-finding to the 
judge appears to comport with the holding in Gaudin because the 
judge’s finding that the defendant killed the victim looks akin to a 
judge’s determination of probable cause in the context of a suppression 
hearing.  But, if the reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing is 
considered as a sanction designed to deter and punish conduct that is 
inimical to the judicial system, it seems reasonable to ask whether that 
sanction operates as a device that undermines the defendant’s 
 129. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 520–21 (1995). 
 130. Id. at 519 (quoting Brief for Appellant in Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 26, 277 (1929), 
O.T. 1928, No. 555, at p. 109, (argument for appellant)). 
 131. Id. at 514. 
 132. Id. at 514–15 (quoting Court of Ulster v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979)). 
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constitutional right to have a jury determine every element of the crime 
charged beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Long before Giles was decided, Professor Friedman argued that 
because the reflexive application of the doctrine invoked a preliminary 
question of evidentiary admissibility, the identity between the factual 
evidentiary predicate to be decided by the judge and the factual elements 
of the crime of homicide should not be troubling.133  This reasoning has 
been adopted by subsequent court decisions as a justification for the 
reflexive application of the doctrine.134  When deciding preliminary 
questions of evidentiary admissibility, courts are engaging in fact-
finding for a different purpose than juries, and courts adhere to a 
different standard of proof.135  Application of the forfeiture rule in 
homicide cases is thus said to be analogous to the admissibility 
determination of a court when deciding whether to admit the statements 
of a coconspirator under the coconspirator admission exception to the 
rule against hearsay.136  It also has been said that there is no risk that the 
jury will be infected by the judge’s fact-finding because the judge is not 
announcing to the jury that he made such a fact-finding, so the jury is 
still free to reach its own conclusion about the defendant’s guilt or 
innocence.137  None of these justifications for the reflexive application 
of the doctrine supports the conclusion that doing so does not undermine 
the defendant’s right to have the jury determine every element of the 
crime charged by the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 
First, that a judge decides facts for the purpose of sanctioning the 
defendant with the admission of evidence, while the jury decides facts 
for the purpose of rendering a verdict, does not ensure that reflexive 
forfeiture by wrongdoing is constitutionally sound.  As Justice Scalia 
pointedly noted in Gaudin, context is an important consideration.  The 
context of judge/jury fact allocations led the Court to declare sentencing 
schemes to be a violation of the right to trial by jury when the judge 
decided facts for purposes of sentencing a defendant to a term of 
 133. Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 2, at 522. 
 134. United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961, 968 (S.D. Ohio 2005); State v. Jensen, 727 
N.W.2d 518, 533–34 (Wis. 2007); People v. Baca, No. E032929, 2004 WL 2750083, at *11 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Dec. 2, 2004). 
 135. Richard D. Friedman, Am. Bar. Assoc., Does an Accused Forfeit the Confrontation Right by 
Murdering a Witness, Absent a Purpose to Render Her Unavailable?, 35 PREVIEW OF THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT CASES 364 (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/ 
ABA_Preview7_2008.pdf. 
 136. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 968; Jensen, 727 N.W.2d at 535–36. 
 137. Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 2, at 523; Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 968 (noting that 
“jury’s ignorance of the court’s threshold evidentiary determination” supports the court’s application of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing to admit murder victim’s statements against defendant alleged to have 
committed murder). 
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confinement outside the statutory maximum—a purpose that is different 
from the jury’s function.138  In United States v. Booker,139 the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed its prior holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey140 that 
Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a 
sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a 
plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or 
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.141 
Difference of purpose then cannot be an entirely satisfactory ground for 
finding that the reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing does 
not undermine the right to trial by jury.  Had it been, the Supreme Court 
would have had ample ground to uphold the power of the courts to 
decide facts for the purpose of sentencing defendants.142  The context of 
the fact allocation, therefore, seems to be an important consideration 
when evaluating its constitutionality. 
The context in which forfeiture by wrongdoing is applied suggests 
that comparisons with questions of evidentiary admissibility are 
misplaced when assessing the extent to which the judge/jury allocation 
undermines constitutional principles.  The required fact-findings for 
forfeiture by wrongdoing are unlike any hearsay exception.  All hearsay 
exceptions focus on the nature and circumstances under which the 
statements were made, as a proxy for reliability or trustworthiness.143  
Even the coconspirator admission exception to the hearsay rule,144  
which is frequently cited to support the proposition that reflexive 
application of forfeiture by wrongdoing does not create constitutional 
 138. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
 139. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 140. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 141. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466). 
 142. Murphy, supra note 15, at 981–82 (forecasting Apprendi and Booker by arguing that Sixth 
Amendment should not be susceptible to manipulation through legislatively converting elements of 
offense into sentencing factors). 
 143. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (dying declarations); 804(b)(3) (statement against interest); 
804(b)(4) (statement of personal or family history); 803(2) (excited utterance); 803(4) (statements for 
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment); 803(3) (then-existing mental, emotional, or physical 
condition).  See also Bocchino & Sonenshein, supra note 39, at 51 (“Unlike all other hearsay exceptions, 
the Forfeiture by Wrongdoing exception is not based on trustworthiness, but rather a combination of 
deterrence, punishment and equity, and is more fairly described as a sanction for such conduct.  Unlike 
the other Rule 804(b) exceptions to the hearsay rule, there are no requirements in Rule 804(b)(6) for 
circumstantial indicia of reliability for the statements involved.”); Murphy, supra note 15, at 976–77 
(noting that allocation of evidentiary or pretrial matters to judges finds support in the purposes of 
enhancing the reliability of evidence or shielding the fact-finder from evidence that is unconstitutionally 
obtained). 
 144. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) (1997).  Strictly speaking, coconspirator admissions are exempt 
from the definition of hearsay altogether but are commonly referred to as an exception to the hearsay 
rule. 
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concerns,145 rests on the competence of the evidence sought to be 
admitted: Was the statement made by a coconspirator during the course 
of and in furtherance of a conspiracy?146  Moreover, in contrast to the 
rationale underlying forfeiture by wrongdoing, judicial allocation of the 
coconspirator exception protects the potentially innocent defendant from 
the jury’s unnecessary exposure to highly prejudicial evidence, making 
it a less than apt comparison.147  Forfeiture by wrongdoing differs from 
coconspirator admissions on both of these counts.  The judicial fact-
finding operates to prejudice the defendant, not protect him.  And, more 
importantly, the doctrine’s application does not turn on preliminary 
questions of evidentiary admissibility—such as whether a confession is 
inadmissible because it was coerced;148 whether a statement qualifies as 
 145. See, e.g., United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1280–81 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. 
White, 116 F.3d 903, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961, 968 (S.D. 
Ohio 2005); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 173 (Mass. 2005) (“functionally equivalent”); 
People v. Baca, No. E032929, 2004 WL 2750083, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2004) (“[T]he 
procedures for addressing forfeiture by wrongdoing were drawn from the coconspirator hearsay 
exception . . . .”). 
 146. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) provides, in relevant part, that a statement is not hearsay if it is 
offered against a party and is: 
a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy.  The contents of the statement shall be considered but are not alone sufficient 
to establish . . . the existence of the conspiracy and the participation therein of the 
declarant and the party against whom the statement is offered . . . . 
See also Bourjailly v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988); Christopher B. Mueller, The Federal 
Coconspirator Exception: Action, Assertion, and Hearsay, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 323, 387–88 (1984).  
Although the judge decides the same factual predicate when it determines whether a statement meets the 
coconspirator exception, the judge is engaging in an evidentiary competence analysis.  Of course, as 
with reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing, it is troubling that the judge’s fact-finding 
controls the jury’s fact-finding on the same question.  Id.  But the fact-finding being made is 
contextually quite different and the reason for its allocation to the court is theoretically to benefit the 
defendant, which is quite unlike the reason for judicial allocation of the factual predicate for forfeiture 
by wrongdoing.  See infra note 147. 
 147. David E. Seidelson, The Federal Rules of Evidence: A Few Surprises, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
453, 457 (1984); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 
STAN. L. REV. 271, 283 n.38 (1975) (“[T]he judge is making the preliminary determination for a reason, 
and often the reason is to protect the jury from evidence likely to be misused.  The defendant’s 
protection in such cases rests with the judge.  Even where the rationale for the rule of competency is not 
at all related to enhancing the reliability of the jury verdict, once it is recognized that a preliminary fact 
question is also an element of a criminal charge, it is difficult to argue that a conviction should stand 
where a trained judge finds a reasonable doubt as to an element of the crime.”).  The congruency of the 
judicial fact-finding with the jury fact-finding that can arise under the coconspirator exception provoked 
considerable unease in the courts before the Supreme Court’s decision in Bourjailly, with six circuit 
courts taking the view that the fact-finding must be allocated to the jury.  United States v. Honneus, 508 
F.2d 566, 577 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. Appolo, 476 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. 
Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Santos, 385 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1967); United States 
v. Sanders, 463 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Pennett, 496 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1974). 
 148. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287–88 (1991) (applying harmless error 
standard to coerced confession). 
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a dying declaration,149 excited utterance,150 or record of regularly 
conducted activity;151 whether evidence is inadmissible because seized 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment;152 and whether evidence is 
relevant153 or if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice—which all focus on the competence of 
evidence.154  Instead, forfeiture by wrongdoing is concerned with 
punishing and discouraging egregious conduct. 
Numerous authorities agree that forfeiture by wrongdoing is 
appropriately characterized as a sanction for wrongful conduct derived 
from equitable principles.155  In its ordinary application (i.e., when it is 
not applied reflexively), the sanction is considered necessary to partially 
remedy the harm caused to the state’s ability to prosecute the case.156  
The alleged wrongful conduct—i.e., making a witness unavailable at 
trial—is penalized by the loss of hearsay and confrontation right 
objections to the admission of evidence.  But, it could just as easily be 
any other penalty that accomplished the desired remedial and 
 149. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). 
 150. FED. R. EVID. 803(2). 
 151. FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
 152. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961) (evidence seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment is inadmissible in state courts). 
 153. FED. R. EVID. 402. 
 154. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 155. Joan Comparet-Cassani, Crawford and the Forfeiture By Wrongdoing Doctrine, 42 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 118, 1212 (2005) (noting that forfeiture by wrongdoing is an “equitable punishment”); 
Bocchino & Sonenshein, supra note 39, at 51 (stating that forfeiture is grounded in “a combination of 
deterrence, punishment and equity, and is more fairly described as a sanction”); Lininger, The Sound of 
Silence, supra note 5, at 896 (describing forfeiture by wrongdoing as “[t]he sanction for witness 
tampering”); Ralph Ruebner & Eugene Goryunov, Giles v. California: Sixth Amendment Confrontation 
Right, Forfeiture By Wrongdoing, and A Misguided Departure From The Common Law and The 
Constitution, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 577, 586–88 (2009) (refuting arguments that forfeiture by wrongdoing 
is a “waiver” rather than a true “forfeiture” and stating that “forfeiting of confrontation rights is the price 
that the accused pays as a penalty for having caused the unavailability of the out-of-court declarant’s 
live testimony through his or her wrongful conduct”) (emphasis added); People v. Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 
817, 821 (N.Y. 1995) (finding that rather than being a waiver, the doctrine is “more realistically 
described as a forfeiture dictated by sound public policy”).  But see James F. Flanagan, Foreshadowing 
The Future of Forefeiture/Estoppel By Wrongdoing: Davis v. Washington and The Necessity of The 
Defendant’s Intent to Intimidate The Witness, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 863, 867–68 (2007) (describing rule as 
an “estoppels” to avoid “label” that implies “automatic and unintentional loss of the right to 
confrontation” or assumes the conclusion that defendant waives the right to confront through “actions 
against the witness”).  In the author’s view, the rule operates as a forfeiture rather than a waiver, in that 
the defendant has not acquiesced in the loss of his rights or voluntarily relinquished them.  See Flanagan, 
Reach, supra note 64, at 473–74 (citing Peter Westen, Away From Waiver: A Rationale for the 
Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214, 1214 (1977)) 
(arguing that defendant has not voluntarily relinquished rights and that the rule “occurs by operation of 
law, regardless of the state of mind of the defendant,” thus making forfeiture a more appropriate 
rationale). 
 156. Flanagan, Reach, supra note 64, at 474–75. 
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prophylactic goals.157 
Thus, in Illinois v. Allen, the Court observed that a defendant could be 
stripped of his Confrontation Clause right to remain in the courtroom 
and personally confront the witnesses against him as a penalty for 
behavior that was so disruptive as to obstruct trial proceedings.158  
Similarly, the California Court of Appeal in People v. Pearson, applied 
forfeiture by wrongdoing to a defendant’s claim of double jeopardy.159  
In Pearson, the defendant was tried for assault with special 
circumstances (using a deadly weapon), stalking, and threatening the 
victim, but because the victim refused to appear to testify on behalf of 
the prosecution, the stalking and threatening counts were dismissed.160  
Shortly thereafter, defense counsel advised the court that the defendant 
had been in touch with the victim, who wished to appear to testify on the 
defendant’s behalf on the other charges.161  The trial court reinstated the 
dismissed counts and permitted the prosecution to reopen its case.162  
After the victim testified, the defendant was found guilty of assault, but 
was acquitted of stalking and making criminal threats.163 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by 
reinstating the stalking and criminal threat counts of the indictment on 
the ground that it constituted double jeopardy.164  The California Court 
of Appeal held that 
a defendant is estopped from seeking refuge under the jeopardy umbrella 
where he has procured an 1118.1 [the relevant California code making the 
dismissal of charges final] judgment by designed wrongdoing.  Even from 
the cold record it is apparent that appellant prevented or dissuaded a 
witness . . . and/or conspired with [the victim] to obstruct justice.165 
In reaching that holding, the court cited Reynolds166 and Giles167 to 
support the conclusion that “there is no logical reason why the forfeiture 
concept should not be applicable here.  The presenting situation . . . is 
equally, if not more, egregious and cries out for an estoppel.”168  The 
 157. James F. Flanagan, In Defense of Giles – A Response to Professor Lininger, 87 TEX. L. REV. 
67, 72 (2009). 
 158. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342–43 (1970). 
 159. 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234, 238–39 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 160. Id. at 237. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 239. 
 166. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–61 (1878). 
 167. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008). 
 168. Pearson, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 239. 
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court relied on the doctrine’s purpose of—“removing the otherwise 
powerful incentive for defendants to intimidate, bribe, and kill witnesses 
against them—in other words, it is grounded in ‘the ability of courts to 
protect the integrity of their proceedings’”169—to support reinstatement 
of the dismissed counts under the unusual factual circumstances. 
The context of forfeiture by wrongdoing thus suggests that it is more 
closely analogous to discovery sanctions than to preliminary questions 
of evidentiary admissibility.  A duty to preserve evidence arises when a 
party reasonably should know that the evidence may be relevant to 
probable or anticipated litigation, even before a lawsuit arises.170  
Failure to observe that duty to preserve may properly be viewed as an 
interference with the conduct of trial, and the judge may appropriately 
employ his “inherent power to control the judicial process and 
litigation”171 to sanction the failure as a means of “leveling the playing 
field.”172  The sanction may include permitting the jury to draw an 
adverse inference from the absent evidence173 or even result in the 
“death” of the party’s claims or defenses.174 
Moreover, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), the leading 
codification of the common law rule, does little to answer the question 
of whether forfeiture by wrongdoing should be properly characterized as 
a preliminary question of evidentiary admissibility for the purpose of 
evaluating the constitutionality of the judge/jury fact-finding allocation.  
The cases cited by the Advisory Committee in support of Rule 804(b)(6) 
uniformly applied forfeiture by wrongdoing as a sanction for conduct 
interfering with the conduct of the judge’s proceedings, but did not 
apply the Rule reflexively.175  The history of the doctrine before the 
 169. Id. (quoting Giles, 554 U.S. at 374). 
 170. See Asian Jade Soc’y of N.Y. & N.J. Inc. v. Port Auth., 601 F. Supp. 2d 566 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
 171. Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 172. Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 156 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 173. See Mosaid Tech. Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Ltd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 338 (D.N.J. 2004) 
(discussing “spoliation inference” sanction). 
 174. See, e.g., Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d 939, 945 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
dismissal was warranted where plaintiff sold vehicle for salvage without notice to defendant despite 
defendant’s request to examine vehicle). 
 175. United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2nd Cir. 1982) (applying doctrine where 
key prosecution witness was murdered on third day of defendant’s trial on drug charges); United States 
v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2nd Cir. 1992) (witness withdrew from plea agreement requiring 
cooperation with government prosecution of defendant after receiving threatening letters from 
defendant); United States v. Potamitis, 739 F.2d 784, 789 (2nd Cir. 1984) (witnesses in conspiracy 
case); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1982) (murder-by-hire defendant found to have caused 
witness to refuse to testify); United State v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1358–59 (8th Cir. 1976); United 
States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 631 (5th Cir. 1982) (affirming district court’s admission of murdered 
witness’s grand jury testimony as substantive evidence on RICO charges that were already pending 
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Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted supports its characterization as 
a rule of equity designed to remove any supposed benefit that the 
defendant might achieve by witness tampering.176 
Consequently, any comparison drawn between preliminary questions 
of evidentiary admissibility, which Gaudin recognized are properly 
allocated to the judge, and forfeiture by wrongdoing seem misplaced.  
When applied reflexively, it is a penalty placed on a defendant for 
allegedly committing a crime that he has not yet been convicted of 
committing, with the penalty being the admission of evidence that the 
government believes will increase the likelihood of conviction.  The 
context suggests that the judge’s fact-finding is very closely intertwined 
with the jury’s fact-finding and, perhaps more troubling, is expressly 
designed to determine whether the defendant committed the crime he is 
charged with committing. 
Adding a requirement that the court also find a purpose to keep the 
victim from being a witness—which the Giles Court held is 
constitutionally required only when the government seeks to admit 
testimonial statements—does not alter the basic dilemma presented by 
the trial court’s use of forfeiture to sanction the conduct being charged 
through the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence.177  First, 
Gaudin instructs that the criminal defendant is entitled to have every 
element decided by the jury.178  If the jury does not decide each element 
by the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the defendant has not been 
afforded the full extent of his rights under the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments.179  The purpose requirement does not address the question 
of whether the required judicial fact-finding on an element of the crime 
charged changes the burden of proof regarding that same element.  Thus, 
before the murder of the witness; indictment was amended to add charge of violating the witness’s civil 
rights but the witness’s grand jury testimony was not offered in support of that charge of the indictment).  
None of these cases involved the reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing.  Thevis suggests the 
great care that was sometimes taken by courts to avoid reflexive application.  Thevis, 665 F.2d at 627–
28.  The witness was murdered after testifying before the grand jury and after the grand jury issued the 
RICO indictment.  Id.  The government then obtained a second indictment adding a charge of violating 
the witness’s civil rights.  Id.  At trial, the government asserted that the grand jury testimony should be 
admitted as evidence supporting the RICO claims under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, but did 
not assert that the evidence should be considered in support of the civil rights claim.  Id. at 627.  The 
court permitted the government to present evidence of the civil rights claim first, then, after that 
evidence had been presented to the jury, the court applied the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine to admit 
the grand jury testimony in support of only the RICO charges.  Id. at 628. 
 176. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 146 (1878). 
 177. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court noted that intent or motive for a crime is 
“more often than not the sine qua non of a violation of criminal law.”  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 493 n.18 (2000). 
 178. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511–12, 522–23 (1995). 
 179. Id. 
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while adding a purpose requirement may avoid question-begging, it does 
not address the potential conflict with Gaudin’s holding and reasoning. 
Second, when applying forfeiture by wrongdoing reflexively in a 
homicide case, the purpose inquiry does not protect the integrity of the 
homicide trial’s proceedings.  Where a defendant prevents a witness 
who would be expected to testify against him at trial from appearing, 
forfeiture operates to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.180  
But when that defendant is brought before the court for allegedly 
murdering a victim who might have testified at some future or other 
proceeding or might have cooperated with the police about another 
crime, the defendant has not thwarted or in any way interfered with the 
murder trial.181  Regardless of the defendant’s motive for killing a 
victim, her conduct has not achieved the goal that purportedly supports 
the application of forfeiture by wrongdoing—she has not “thwarted the 
normal operation of the criminal justice system by virtue of the wrongful 
act.”182  Because the rule is not being applied to preserve the integrity of 
the trial itself, it seems incongruous to assert that the purpose fact-
finding relates to a legitimate equitable interest in protecting the 
integrity of the trial proceedings. 
A hypothetical demonstrates this incongruity.  Assume that Davis 
kills his spouse to prevent her testimony at a divorce proceeding, and 
then is hailed before the court for her homicide.  In the divorce 
proceeding, the unavailability of his spouse creates a benefit to Davis 
and also represents an interference with that proceeding.  In the 
homicide proceeding, the unavailability of Davis’s spouse does not alter 
the ordinary availability of witnesses and cannot be said to interfere with 
the homicide trial.183  The purpose of killing the victim does not relate to 
the equitable interest in having the homicide trial proceed without 
improper or illegal interference.  Thus, the Supreme Court’s addition of 
purpose to the required fact-finding does not provide a principled basis 
to conclude that the homicide defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
are adequately protected. 
 
 180. Camparet-Cassani, supra note 155, at 1196 (Forfeiture “partially offsets the perpetrator’s 
rewards for his misconduct.”). 
 181. See id. at 1192. 
 182. Id. at 1207. 
 183. Indeed, if Davis’s spouse was alive, his homicide trial could not proceed—there could be no 
more effective means of interfering with the homicide trial than to produce the victim alive. 
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B. Allocation to the Judge: Undermining the Jury? 
The context of forfeiture by wrongdoing demonstrates that it should 
not be deemed a question of evidentiary admissibility for the purpose of 
assessing the judge/jury fact-finding allocation.  Therefore, closer 
scrutiny should be given to the effect of judicial allocation of the 
required fact-findings on the defendant’s right to have every element of 
the criminal charges decided by the jury by the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard.184  If courts remove the right to confront witnesses, as 
well as the right to make hearsay objections, on the basis of a judicial 
finding that the defendant committed the homicide and had a purpose of 
preventing the victim from being a witness or cooperating with 
authorities, or admit non-testimonial hearsay on the basis of the judicial 
determination that the defendant killed the victim, then there is a 
significant risk that an erroneous fact-finding will interfere with the 
jury’s determination of whether the defendant committed the homicide.  
The judicial fact-finding affects the jury both in its fact-finding role and 
its role of evaluating the credibility of witnesses,185 and indeed, is 
calculated to affect the trial’s outcome.186 
1. Complete Circularity 
In Giles, the Court acknowledged that “a prior judicial assessment 
that the defendant is guilty as charged, does not sit well with the right to 
trial by jury.”187  Adding the requirement that a purpose of the killing be 
to prevent the victim from being a witness—a fact-finding thought to be 
different from the one engaged in by the jury—was described as a means 
of avoiding the problem of complete circularity between judicial and 
 184. When a judge admits evidence based in part on her view that the defendant committed the act 
of homicide as charged, the effect is to reduce the jury’s discretionary power by treating that defendant 
differently than other homicide defendants.  The jury’s acquittal power is designed to allow juries to 
“protect the defendant’s liberty, not to threaten it.”  Rachel Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal 
Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 49 n.63 (2003). 
 185. The circularity is particularly troublesome given the differences between judge and jury; 
judges may view evidence through an institutional bias that could affect the fact-finding process.  See id. 
at 72 (“[B]ecause the judge is a repeat player, she might be more inclined to favor the government’s 
view of the facts as the government also is a repeat player in the criminal justice process.”). 
 186. The position that forfeiture by wrongdoing has as its primary purpose the elimination of the 
benefit that the defendant would have achieved by the killing does not support reflexive application of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing.  First, the victim of a homicide could never testify at the homicide trial; there 
is no difference between the availability of a victim killed in a random act of violence and the victim 
killed because the victim is a threatened witness to some other proceeding.  Thus, only the punitive and 
deterrent purposes of the doctrine are served when it is applied reflexively in the homicide case. 
 187. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 375 (2008).  Part II-D-2 of the Court’s opinion found 
support only from Justices Roberts, Thomas and Alito. 
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jury decision-making.188  The addition of purpose does not solve the 
circularity problem identified by the Supreme Court.  First, it does not 
always remove the complete circularity that “does not sit well with the 
right to trial by jury.”189  Even in those cases where complete circularity 
does not exist, Gaudin’s requirement that “every element” be submitted 
to the jury casts some doubt on the legitimacy of solving the circularity 
problem by requiring additional fact-finding. 
In those jurisdictions that provide enhancements for murders intended 
to prevent a witness from testifying, the purpose element of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing merely cements complete unity with the elements of the 
charges against the defendant.190  Following Giles, at least one state 
supreme court has found that the jury’s verdict finding the defendant 
guilty of the aggravating circumstances established the correctness of 
the trial court’s fact findings for purposes of applying forfeiture by 
wrongdoing reflexively,191 aptly demonstrating the complete circularity 
that the Giles plurality sought to avoid by requiring that a purpose of the 
homicide be to prevent the victim from being a witness.  In other words, 
the mens rea that equity is said to demand may be the same mens rea 
that the jury will consider as an element of one or more of the charges.  
In cases where this complete circularity exists, allocation of the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing fact-findings to the judge creates a very real 
risk that if the judge’s fact-findings are erroneous, the jury’s fact-
findings will have been infected by that error.  Allowing the judge to 
pre-judge the defendant’s guilt using the preponderance standard creates 
a risk that different courts could reach different outcomes.  In one case, 
the defendant will be allowed to make his Sixth Amendment and 
hearsay objections while in another he will be stripped of them.  There is 
a significant risk that the defendant stripped of his rights will be 
convicted where if these rights were retained, he may not have been 
convicted. 
Moreover, requiring a finding of purpose does not eliminate the 
complete unity between the judicial fact-finding that the defendant 
 188. Id. at 353.  See also id. at 378 (Souter, J., concurring) (“The only thing saving admissibility 
and liability determinations from question begging would be (in a jury case) the distinct functions of 
judge and jury: judges would find by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant killed (and so 
would admit the testimonial statement), while the jury could so find only on proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Equity demands something more than this near circularity before the right to confrontation is 
forfeited, and more is supplied by showing intent to prevent the witness from testifying.”). 
 189. Id. at 353. 
 190. See, e.g., State v. Fry, 926 N.E.2d 1239, 1262 (Ohio 2010) (holding that forfeiture by 
wrongdoing applied in case in which jury subsequently found the defendant guilty of murder and 
aggravating circumstance of purposely killing the victim to prevent testimony, or in retaliation for 
testimony, in a criminal proceeding). 
 191. Id. 
34
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss4/3
G-KARSAI 8/27/2011  5:06:56 PM 
2011] FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING 1405 
 
caused the victim to be unavailable and the homicide charge—both the 
judge and the jury must decide whether the defendant killed the 
victim.192  If, as Gaudin holds, judicial determination of any element of 
the crime charged violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
trial by jury, then the additional requirement that a purpose of the killing 
be to prevent the victim from being a witness does not answer the 
question of whether the court may prejudge an element of the crime 
charged, thereby making the prosecutor’s case less burdensome.193  
Thus, because there is complete unity between the judge’s fact-finding 
and at least one element of the crime charged and because this fact-
finding forms the basis for a sanction that is calculated to aid the 
prosecution and harm the defense, the reflexive application of the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine has troubling implications for the 
constitutional rights addressed by the Gaudin Court. 
A related concern is the allocation of witness credibility to the judge.  
A court that applies forfeiture by wrongdoing reflexively must reject the 
defendant’s version of events if a defense is raised.194  When forfeiture 
by wrongdoing is applied reflexively, the credibility questions to be 
decided by the court closely align with the credibility questions that the 
jury will address.  Federal Rule of Evidence 412(c)—the Rape Shield 
rule—was substantively amended in 1994 to remove the following 
sentence: 
Notwithstanding subdivision (b) of Rule 104, if the relevancy of the 
evidence which the accused seeks to offer in trial depends upon the 
fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court, at the hearing in chambers or 
at a subsequent hearing in chambers scheduled for such purpose, shall 
accept evidence on the issue of whether such condition of fact is fulfilled 
and shall determine such issue.195 
The Advisory Committee recognized that the amendment was 
necessary to avoid undermining a defendant’s right to trial by jury as 
 192. Although Giles called purpose a separate fact-finding that eliminated complete circularity 
between judge and jury fact-findings, the distinction may be more apparent than real in many homicide 
cases.  The Supreme Court pointed out in Apprendi v. New Jersey when it held that a state law hate 
crime sentence enhancement “define[d] a particular kind of prohibited intent, and a particular intent is 
more often than not the sine qua non of a violation of a criminal law.”  530 U.S. 446, 493 n.18 (2000). 
 193. Furthermore, it is not clear that “purpose” is truly meaningfully distinct from “motive” or 
“intent,” which, in a homicide case, could be an element of the crime and thus intertwined with the 
ultimate issue of guilt or innocence.  See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 493 n.18 (“[A] particular intent is more 
often than not the sine qua non of a violation in criminal law.”). 
 194. People v. Moore, No. 01-CA-1760, 2004 WL 1690247 (Colo. App. July 29, 2004) (defendant 
found guilty of criminal negligence). 
 195. Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. EVID. 412. 
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well as the constitutional right to due process.196  The Advisory 
Committee indicated that a rule that allowed the judge to admit the 
defendant’s evidence of prior consensual activities with the victim if the 
judge believed the defendant, but exclude the evidence if the judge 
concluded that the defendant’s evidence was not credible, would violate 
the right to trial by jury.197  This raises the question whether there is any 
principled basis to distinguish between a rule that excludes the evidence 
proffered by the defendant based on the court’s determination that the 
defendant’s version of the facts is untrue, and a rule that admits the 
prosecutor’s evidence based on the same conclusion about the 
defendant’s credibility. 
In any homicide case in which a defense is asserted, reflexive 
application of forfeiture by wrongdoing necessarily turns on the judge’s 
view of the defendant’s credibility, including the judge’s view of the 
defendant’s affirmative defenses.  Consider the Jensen case—a high-
profile case in which the defendant was convicted of murdering his wife 
by poisoning her.198  The asserted defense was that the victim had been 
depressed and taken her own life, framing the defendant.199  Before her 
death, the victim wrote a letter to a police detective, which was to be 
delivered in the event anything happened to her.200  In the letter, the 
victim prospectively pinned her husband as the cause of her death.201  In 
order to admit the letter under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, the 
trial court first had to reject the defendant’s version of events, finding 
the prosecutor’s version to be more credible.202 
If excluding the defendant’s proffered evidence under the prior Rape 
Shield rule was considered to be a likely violation of the right to a jury 
trial by substituting the judge’s evaluation of witness credibility for the 
 196. Id. 
 197. 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
MANUAL: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 396 (5th ed. 1990) (“This is quite 
a bit different from having Judges rule on most competency questions [where the] Judge is not usurping 
the function of the jury.  [In such cases t]he Judge is not addressing the merits of the case and deciding 
whether one side or the other is truthful.  Rather, the Judge is assuring that the evidence meets the usual 
evidentiary standards.  But when the Judge decides whether or not a defense is true or false and decides 
that on the basis of the credibility of the witnesses, the Judge is doing what the jury is supposed to do in 
a serious criminal case covered by the Sixth Amendment.”). 
 198. Jay Schadler & Susan B. Miller, Death Foretold, 20/20 (ABC television broadcast Feb. 29, 
2008), available at http://abcnews.go.com/2020/story?id=4359389. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. State v. Jensen 727 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Wis. 2007).  See also United States v. Garcia-Meza, 
403 F.3d 364, 369 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming trial court’s application of forfeiture by wrongdoing before 
Supreme Court imposed purpose requirement; in his defense, defendant asserted lack of premeditation, 
which is inconsistent with having a “purpose” for the homicide). 
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jury’s, then the application of forfeiture by wrongdoing to admit the 
victim’s words in the homicide case seems equally troubling.  While it is 
true that refusing to admit the defendant’s evidence of innocence 
implicates due process as well as the right to trial by jury,203 that 
difference should not affect the right to trial by jury analysis.  The test 
for whether the right to trial by jury has been violated is whether the 
device has undermined the jury’s fact-finding function.204  If that is the 
correct test, then it seems unpersuasive to distinguish the trial court’s 
consideration of witness credibility when deciding reflexive application 
of forfeiture by wrongdoing questions from the credibility allocation that 
led to the amendment of Rule 412.  In either instance, the admission or 
exclusion of the evidence holds great potential to be outcome 
determinative against the defendant. 
2. Reducing the Burden of Proof 
Although forfeiture by wrongdoing is not a preliminary question of 
evidentiary admissibility that turns on evidentiary competence, its 
application does result in the admission of otherwise inadmissible 
inculpatory evidence.  Admitting such evidence has a direct impact on 
whether the beyond a reasonable doubt standard has been met.  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recognized that “guilt in a criminal 
case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by evidence 
confined to that which long experience in the common-law tradition, to 
some extent embodied in the Constitution, has crystallized into rules of 
evidence consistent with that standard.”205  The rules of evidence, 
having evolved from the common law and the criminal defendant’s 
constitutional rights, play an important role in assessing whether the jury 
has determined the defendant’s guilt of every element of the crime 
charged beyond a reasonable doubt.  Rules of evidence are protections 
designed, at least in part, to ensure that the defendant is not wrongfully 
convicted by placing too much power with the jury to act 
capriciously.206  When a court strips those protections from the homicide 
 203. Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. EVID. 412. 
 204. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277–78 (1993). 
 205. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949) (affirming court’s consideration of 
evidence at suppression hearing seeking to exclude evidence seized during search of vehicle). 
 206. One reason for rules of evidence 
is mistrust of juries . . . and this point goes far to prove that faith in juries is limited.  The 
hearsay doctrine exists, for example, largely because we think lay jurors cannot properly 
evaluate statements made outside their presence, and the rules governing character 
evidence assume that juries place too much weight on such proof or employ it improperly 
for punitive purposes. 
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defendant on the ground that he in fact killed the victim (whether the 
court also must determine the defendant’s purposes in committing the 
crime), the effect is to give an advantage to the government’s case. 
When a defendant engages in witness tampering, the result is harm to 
the government’s proof because a witness who would have testified at 
trial is no longer available.  But when a defendant is charged with 
murder, the victim is not a witness in that proceeding, and there has been 
no harm to the prosecution’s murder case.  For example, assume that a 
homicide defendant would duly lodge her hearsay and Confrontation 
Clause objections to the proffered victim statements—she in fact tells 
the court that she objects.  Assume also that the prosecutor’s response is 
that the defendant forfeited the right to object to the admission of the 
victim’s words because the defendant made the victim unavailable to 
testify with the purpose of making that victim unavailable as a witness at 
some proceeding.  Before the court can rule that the defendant forfeited 
the right to object, the court must first conclude that the defendant did 
something to make the victim unavailable as a witness—i.e., that the 
defendant killed the victim as the prosecution charges.  Moreover, 
because forfeiture by wrongdoing requires that this act be wrongful, the 
court’s ruling on the question of whether the defendant killed the victim 
is likely to incorporate a factual determination that the killing was not 
justified or excused.  In other words, the court must decide that the 
defendant’s alleged defenses, if any, are invalid or untrue. 
Gaudin instructs that a criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled 
to have the jury decide every element of the crime charged by the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard.  In a homicide case, this includes 
the question of whether he or she killed the victim.  The court cannot 
take these issues from the jury.  The court cannot give a directed verdict 
of conviction, no matter how overwhelming the evidence of guilt.207  
Nor can the court affect the jury’s consideration of each element of the 
crime charged by applying a conclusive presumption to any such 
element.208  The question is whether anything less than a conclusive 
presumption can constitute a “device” that “undermines” the rights 
linked in Gaudin.  In other words, is judicial interference with the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard, based in whole or in part on fact-
findings that represent circularity with the jury’s required consideration 
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 2 (4th ed. 2009).  For a contrary view, 
see Edson R. Sunderland, The Problem of Trying Issues, 5 TEX. L. REV. 18, 24 (1926) (arguing that 
evidence should not be excluded from jury’s consideration). 
 207. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105–06 (1895). 
 208. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 10 (1999). 
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of each element of the crime, constitutionally suspect?209 
Using forfeiture, a court can admit evidence that is (a) strong, (b) 
possibly un-confronted and untested by cross-examination, and (c) 
otherwise inadmissible—and therefore potentially unreliable, 
untrustworthy, or susceptible to misuse or overreliance by the jury.210  
Removing the defendant’s right to object to the admission of the 
victim’s words makes it more likely that a jury will find the element of 
killing the victim to have been proven than if the court had not found 
that the defendant killed the victim as a predicate for finding forfeiture 
of the right to object.211 
What’s the effect on the jury?  The jury is instructed to apply the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard, so one might naturally assert that 
the jury’s function has not been impaired.  But consider the burden of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt—which is constitutionally protected 
and, as the Supreme Court has stated, incorporates “a fundamental value 
determination by our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent 
than to let a guilty defendant go free.”212  The higher burden of proof in 
criminal cases may result in more factually guilty defendants going free 
than if the preponderance of the evidence standard were applied, but it 
also reduces the likelihood that a factually innocent defendant is 
convicted.213 
The difference between the beyond a reasonable doubt standard and a 
lesser standard, such as the preponderance of the evidence, has much to 
do with the quantum of proof.  As evidence mounts, one first meets the 
preponderance hurdle and then, with more evidence, the reasonable 
doubt hurdle.  In other words, evidence only sufficient to prove that a 
defendant killed the victim by a preponderance of the evidence is 
insufficient to prove that the defendant killed the victim beyond 
reasonable doubt.  To meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the 
prosecution needs more or more powerful evidence than it would to 
 209. The criminal defendant’s right to trial by jury “differs fundamentally from other rights to trial 
by jury” thus suggesting “that the criminal defendant’s right carries unique implications for evidence 
rules that allow courts to interfere with a jury fact-finding.”  Katherine Goldwasser, Essay, Vindicating 
The Right To Trial By Jury And The Requirement of Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt: A Critique Of 
The Conventional Wisdom About Excluding Defense Evidence, 86 GEO. L. J. 621, 642 (1998). 
 210. Bocchino & Sonenshein, supra note 39, at 61 (positing that forfeiture by wrongdoing permits 
admission of unreliable statements contrary to the Sixth Amendment). 
 211. See, e.g., Tom Kertscher, Legal Standard to Be Tested; Jensen Could Get Another Trial, 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Feb. 24, 2008, at B1, available at 2008 WLNR 3633101 (Westlaw) 
(reporting that after the trial of accused murderer Mark Jensen, several jurors disclosed that the victim’s 
hearsay letter, admitted through reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing, was “perhaps the 
most important piece of evidence” in favor of conviction). 
 212. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 213. Goldwasser, supra note 209, at 644. 
39
Karsai: FROM GAUDIN TO GILES: CONTEXT, EQUITY, AND THE ADMISSION OF “WORD
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011
G-KARSAI 8/27/2011  5:06:56 PM 
1410 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
meet the lower preponderance of the evidence standard. 
The victim’s words may constitute the more or more powerful 
evidence that is necessary for the prosecution to meet its burden of 
proof.  This proposition is supported by the impact that the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Crawford had on domestic violence prosecutions and 
the numerous discussions the ruling spawned about the need to restore 
the victim’s voice.214  For many cases, whether the victim’s hearsay 
statements are admissible will affect whether the case is prosecutable.215  
Indeed, if this were not true, prosecutors would not argue for an 
expansive use of forfeiture because there would be no need to.  The 
admission of the victim’s statements thus has the effect of reducing the 
burden on the government, effectively making it easier to prove guilt of 
a homicide beyond a reasonable doubt.  By making it easier for the 
government to prove guilt, the forfeiture ruling has an effect that is akin 
to reducing the standard of proof. 
The United States Supreme Court tacitly accepted that the admission 
of inculpatory evidence reduces the burden of proof, in Carmell v. 
Texas.216  There, in a 5–4 decision,217 the Court held that the 
Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause was violated when a Texas statute 
was revised to dispense with a corroboration condition on testimony of 
teen victims of sexual offenses, thereby making the victim’s testimony 
admissible, and applied retroactively to the defendant.218  In its analysis 
 214. Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers, supra note 77, at 772 (discussing examples of Crawford’s 
impact, including dismissal of “up to a dozen domestic violence cases per day [in Dallas County, Texas 
alone] because of evidentiary problems related to Crawford”). 
 215. Id.; Chase, supra note 77, at 1112 (noting that “without the victim’s statements in evidence, 
great difficulty frequently arises in attempting to prove” acts of domestic violence). 
 216. 529 U.S. 513 (2000). 
 217. Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas and Breyer formed the majority; Justice Ginsberg 
dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rhenquist, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Kennedy.  Id. at 515, 553. 
 218. The Texas statute originally provided: 
  A conviction under Chapter 21, Section 22.011, or Section 22.021, Penal Code, is 
supportable on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim of the sexual offense if the 
victim informed any person, other than the defendant, of the alleged offense within six 
months after the date on which the offense is alleged to have occurred.  The requirement 
that the victim inform another person of an alleged offense does not apply if the victim 
was younger than 14 years of age at the time of the alleged offense. 
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07 (Vernon 1983).  The statute was amended to change the age of 
the victim from fourteen to eighteen.  As to the defendant, 
four counts stand or fall depending on whether the child victim exception applies.  Under 
the old law, the exception would not apply, because the victim was more than 14 years 
old at the time of the alleged offenses.  Under the new law, the exception would apply, 
because the victim was under 18 years old at that time.  In short, the validity of four of 
petitioner’s convictions depends on whether the old or new law applies to his case, 
which, in turn, depends on whether the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits the application of 
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of the Ex Post Facto Clause issue, the Court analogized eliminating the 
corroboration requirement to 
retrospectively eliminating an element of the offense, increasing the 
punishment for an existing offense, or lowering the burden of proof . . . .  
In each of these instances, the government subverts the presumption of 
innocence by reducing the number of elements it must prove to overcome 
that presumption; by threatening such severe punishment so as to induce a 
plea to a lesser offense or a lower sentence; or by making it easier to meet 
the threshold for overcoming the presumption.  Reducing the quantum of 
evidence necessary to meet the burden of proof is simply another way of 
achieving the same end.219 
Just as revision of the Texas statute in Carmell allowed previously 
inadmissible evidence—uncorroborated testimony by fourteen to 
eighteen year old sexual assault victims—to be submitted to the jury, the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing sanction likewise admits previously 
inadmissible evidence.  By eliminating objections to evidence when the 
court determines that the homicide defendant killed the victim, forfeiture 
by wrongdoing similarly makes it easier for the government to overcome 
the presumption of innocence and convince the jury of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
To be sure, when forfeiture is applied to a case in which the defendant 
causes a witness other than the victim to be unavailable, the effect on the 
government’s burden is similarly reduced.  But in the homicide case 
where the homicide is the act giving rise to forfeiture the difference is 
that the court is prejudging an element of the crime, which the jury must 
ultimately decide and is using that prejudgment to alter the burden of 
proof.  In effect, if the court finds that the defendant killed the victim 
with a purpose of preventing future testimony in some other proceeding, 
the defendant has forfeited the right to have the issue of whether he 
killed the victim decided by the jury under the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard. 
Where a defendant is being tried for a crime other than making the 
witness unavailable, there is no conflict between the defendant’s right to 
have the jury decide the facts and the judge’s finding that the defendant 
warrants forfeiture of the right to confront a missing witness.  For 
example, if the defendant is accused of conspiracy and the prosecutor 
the new version of Article 38.07 to his case. 
Carmel, 529 U.S. at 518–19.  Highlighting the importance of context to evaluating the constitutionality 
of a device, the majority characterized the Texas statute as affecting the sufficiency of the evidence, 
while the dissent characterized it as an evidentiary provision dictating the circumstances under which the 
jury could evaluate victim testimony.  Id. at 553. 
 219. Carmel, 529 U.S. at 532–33. 
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has been unable to secure the trial attendance of witnesses because the 
defendant’s threats caused the witnesses to flee to Canada, the judge’s 
determination that the defendant threatened the witnesses is distinct 
from the matter before the jury: whether the defendant is guilty of 
conspiracy.  Similarly, if the defendant is accused of domestic violence 
and the prosecutor demonstrates that the victim of the domestic violence 
is unavailable to testify due to the defendant’s separate wrongdoing 
intended to keep the victim from attending the trial, the court’s 
application of forfeiture by wrongdoing requires a finding that the 
defendant wrongfully acted to secure the witness’s unavailability to 
testify and does not bear on the question before the jury: whether the 
defendant is guilty of domestic violence. 
C. Impermissible Comment on the Evidence? 
A somewhat less visible concern is the wisdom of allocating fact-
finding in the reflexive case to the court even if courts and 
commentators alike express no discomfort with the effect on the 
defendant’s rights under Gaudin.  Professor Friedman makes the point 
that 
if the judge does make the factual findings necessary to support a 
conclusion of forfeiture, he or she does not announce to the jury, “Ladies 
and gentlemen, you should know that the reason you have heard this 
statement by the victim is that I have determined as a preliminary matter 
that the accused murdered her.  Of course, you shouldn’t let my decision 
on that point affect you in performing the job assigned to you.”220 
While it is true that the jury is not told of the ruling and does not know 
why victim hearsay statements were admitted, this Article suggests that 
in some ways, in today’s world of modern communication technology, 
this makes the situation worse, not better. 
There seems little dispute that “the trial judge ‘may express his 
opinion upon the facts, provided he makes it clear to the jury that all 
matters of fact are submitted to their determination.’”221  The Court has 
also warned that particular care is required before a judge comments 
upon the guilt of the defendant, for “[a]lthough the power of the judge to 
express an opinion as to the guilt of the defendant exists, it should be 
exercised cautiously and only in exceptional cases.”222  Applying these 
 220. Richard D. Friedman, Does an Accused Forfeit the Confrontation Right by Murdering a 
Witness, Absent a Purpose to Render Her Unavailable?, 35 PREVIEW OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
CASES 364 (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/ABA_Preview7_2008.pdf. 
 221. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933). 
 222. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933). 
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principles to reflexive forfeiture by wrongdoing, the judge has, in fact, 
expressed an opinion on the defendant’s guilt and inferentially 
communicated that opinion by admitting evidence that makes it all the 
more likely that the jury will find the defendant guilty, without making 
clear the jury’s right to disagree with the judge’s opinion.  Especially in 
the modern electronic age, a juror could question or even determine 
whether the admission of the evidence was based on such an opinion—
an infection of the jury that is difficult to cure through instruction.223  It 
is not a far stretch to suggest that one or more jurors in any case either 
may discern that certain evidence was admitted under the doctrine, or 
suppose that it was, even if it was not. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Prosecutors and courts have increasingly used the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine as a means of circumventing the exclusionary 
effects of the rule against hearsay and the right to confront witnesses to 
admit the victim’s hearsay statements to prove that the defendant is 
guilty of the crime of killing the victim.  Using the doctrine in this 
manner raises constitutional concerns that merit closer examination.  
The vexing evidentiary problems in the prosecution of domestic 
violence cases as a result of the rule against hearsay and the criminal 
defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses deserve redress, 
but redress ought not be in the form of undermining the rights conferred 
by the Constitution.  Expansion of the doctrine of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing to the reflexive case seems poised to continue well beyond 
its original scope.224  The literature offers a number of options that could 
serve as alternatives to the reflexive application of the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine, such as creating pretrial opportunities to cross-
examine victims so that their statements are confronted,225 creating a 
hearsay exception that admits the statements of unavailable victims of 
 223. See, for example, CNN, Trials on Demand, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2008/news/ 
trials.on.demand/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2011), which hosts selected video footage of portions of trials 
and commentary about ongoing trials.  See also, James Holderman, Ás Generations X, Y and Z 
Determine the Jury’s Verdict, What Is The Judge’s Role?, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 343, 347–49 (2009) 
(discussing Generation X, Y, and Z’s exposure to the internet and other technology); Erika Patrick, 
Protecting The Defendant’s Right To A Fair Trial In The Information Age, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 71, 71 (2002) 
(noting that the advent of the television and the internet has increased the media in which a trial of 
public opinion can affect the outcome of a legal trial). 
 224. Marc C. McAllister, The Disguised Witness and Crawford’s Uneasy Tension with Craig: 
Brining Uniformity to the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Jurisprudence, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 481, 534–
39 (2010) (arguing that forfeiture by wrongdoing should be applied to permit disguise of in-court 
witnesses who are intimidated and fearful). 
 225. Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers, supra note 77, at 786. 
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violent crime concerning the crime and its perpetrator,226 narrowly 
tailoring the definition of “testimonial” for purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause,227 providing increased protections for victims 
before trial,228 and expanding substantive criminal charges to permit 
prosecution of batterers without the need for the victim’s testimony.229 
The United States Supreme Court has on many occasions reaffirmed 
the importance of the right to trial by jury and the proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard.  Because the right to trial by jury is so 
fundamental to the concept of ordered liberty that it has been called the 
“very palladium of free government,”230 any potential for a rule of law 
to undermine or invade it should receive very close attention.  The 
reasons for the use of forfeiture by wrongdoing in homicide cases, 
measured against the potential to undermine the right to trial by jury, 
may be insufficient to justify the means.  If the criminal defendant really 
is to be presumed innocent until a jury has found him guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, if the jury really is to be the sole fact-finder, and if the 
rules of evidence stand in part to protect the defendant’s constitutional 
right to a fair trial, then there is an obligation to give those principles 
meaning and substance.  If using forfeiture by wrongdoing to sanction 
the defendant charged with murder for killing the victim is an intrusion 
on the defendant’s constitutional right, then the invasion should not be 
easily justified by the strong societal goal of convicting murderers and 
batterers.  As Blackstone wrote in 1769: 
[H]owever convenient [any intrusion] may appear at first, (as doubtless 
all arbitrary powers, well executed, are the most convenient) yet let it be 
again remembered, that delays and little inconveniences in the forms of 
justice, are the price that all free nations must pay for their liberty in more 
substantial matters; that this inroads upon this sacred bulwark of the 
nation are fundamentally opposite to the spirit of our constitution; and 
that, though begun in trifles, the precedent may gradually increase and 
spread, to the utter disuse of juries in questions of the most momentous 
concern.231 
 226. Id. at 800. 
 227. Chase, supra note 77, at 1119–21. 
 228. Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers, supra note 77, at 814. 
 229. Id. at 816–17. 
 230. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 426 (Alexander Hamilton) (M. Beloff ed. 1987). 
 231. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 350 (1769). 
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